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TRANSLATED LITERALLY INTO ENGLISH PROSE

FROM THE TEXT OF NOBBE.

BY WILLIAM LEWERS
Scholar, Trinity College, Dublin

Eleventh Thousand.

LONDON:
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CICERO

ON

OLD AGE

"Titus, if I shall have yielded you any assistance, or alleviated the care which now frets
And, riveted in your heart, distracts you,
Shall I have any recompense?"

1. For I may address you in the same lines, Atticus, in which he addresses Flaminius,

"That man of no large estate, but rich in honour",

although I am well aware that not as Flaminius

"Are you, O Titus, so racked with solicitude, both night and day";

for I know your moderation and evenness of spirit, and I am alive to this, that you have brought not only the surname from Athens, but likewise its refinement and wisdom; and yet I suspect that you are sometimes too deeply affected by the same circumstances as I myself am, the consolation for which is both of a higher order, and requires to be postponed to another occasion. At present, however, I thought proper to write to you something on the subject of *old age*. For of this burden of old age, either already oppressing or at least approaching, which I feel in common with you, I wish both you and myself relieved, although I know that you indeed both bear and will bear it, as you do everything, temperately and wisely. But you occurred to me, when I was disposed to write some treatise on old age, as worthy of a gift, in the enjoyment of which each of us might have a common share. As for myself, I confess the composition of this treatise has been so gratifying, that it has not only obliterated all the annoyances of old

age, but has rendered it easy, nay, even delightful. Never, therefore, will it be possible to praise philosophy adequately, inasmuch as he who obeys her may be enabled to spend all his life free from uneasiness. But on other subjects we have often discoursed at some length, and will often: this treatise on old age I have sent to you. Besides, we have ascribed all the dissertation not to Tithonus, as Aristo the Chian did, fearing that the story would be deficient in authority, but to Marcus Cato in his old age, that the address might carry with it greater authority; at whose house we represent Lælius and Scipio expressing their surprise that he supports old age with such equanimity, and him replying to them. And if he shall appear to discuss the matter with more erudition than he was accustomed to do in his own books, attribute the fact to Greek literature, of which it is certain he was a devoted student in his old age. But why should I say more? for at once the conversation of Cato himself will afford a full exposition of my views on old age.

2. I am wont frequently to admire your transcendant and consummate wisdom, as well in all other matter, Marcus Cato, as even most strikingly in this, that I have never found old age to be irksome to you, which, to most old men, is so disagreeable, that they say they support a burden weightier than Ætna. It is a thing of no great difficulty, Scipio and Lælius, which you seem to admire, for to those who have not within themselves the means of living well and happily, every age is irksome; but those who look to themselves alone for every happiness, to them nothing can appear an evil which the necessity of nature entails. In which class old age is to be reckoned, after the attainment of which all men aspire, and of which when attained they likewise complain, so glaring is the self-contradiction and waywardness of folly. It steals upon them, they say, more rapidly than they had anticipated. In the first place, I *will ask* who was it that coerced them to form an erroneous estimate of its progress? For how does old age steal with more rapidity on youth, than youth on boyhood? Secondly, how would old age be rendered less irksome to them if they were in their eight hundredth year, than in their eightieth? For the past, however lengthened may be its retrospect, after its current has ebbed, could by no consolation soothe the regrets of dotage. Wherever if it be your

custom to admire my wisdom (and I could wish it commensurate with the estimate you have formed of it, and with my own name), it is in this my wisdom lies, that I follow nature, my best guide, as if she were a divinity, and to her am subordinate, by whom it is not probable that when the other parts of the drama of life have been faultlessly composed, the last act has been negligently finished, as if by some lazy dramatist. But, nevertheless, it was inevitable that there should be some end, and, as in the berries of trees and in the fruits of the earth, something shrivelled and dropping off with seasonable ripeness, which a wise man should endure with resignation; for what else is it to rebel against the gods, after the manner of the giants, except to take up arms against our own nature? Læl. But yet, Cato, you will gratify us exceedingly, that I may engage for Scipio also, if, since we expect, and I may say it with confidence, are at least willing to become old, we shall have learned long before from you, by what means even we may be able, most easily, to bear the increasing burden of old age. Cat. Well, Lælius, I will do so, particularly if to each of you, as you say, it is likely to be gratifying. Læl. We wish it, Cato, indeed, unless it be troublesome, just as if you had completed some long journey, on which we also must enter, to see the nature of the destination which you have reached.

3. Cat. I will do so to the best of my ability, Lælius; for I have been often present at the complaints of my contemporaries (and *equals* with *equals*, as the old saying is, *most readily flock together*), the regrets which C. Salinator and Sp. Albinus, men who had been consuls, and almost of my own age, were wont to express, both that they were destitute of pleasures, without which they thought that life was worthless, and that they were now slighted by those by whom they had been accustomed to be courted. And to me they appeared not to accuse that which was the proper subject of accusation; for if that happened from the fault of old age, the same result would fall within the experience of myself and all others of comparatively advanced age; and yet in the case of many of them, I have known old age to have been without a murmur, inasmuch as they thought it no hardship to be emancipated from the thraldom of the passions, and were not despised by the society in which they moved: but of all complaints of this sort, the fault lies

in the character of the man, not in his age. Old men who have their tempers under control, and are not morose or unsocial, spend an old age of tolerable comfort; but uncongeniality and unsociability is irksome to every age. Læl. It is as you say, Cato; but perhaps some one might say that your old age appears more tolerable to you, in consideration of your influence, wealth, and dignity, but that this cannot be the good fortune of many. Cat. That which you mention, Lælius, is indeed something, but the whole is by no means involved in it; as Themistocles is said to have retorted on a certain inhabitant of Seriphus, in an altercation, when the latter had alleged that it was not by his own glory, but by that of his country, he had attained his brilliant eminence, "neither, by Hercules", said he, "if I were an inhabitant of Seriphus, would I have attained nobility, nor would you, if you were an Athenian, ever attain a celebrity"; and this remark can, in the same way, be applied to old age. For neither in extreme poverty can old age be tolerable, even to a wise man; nor to a fool, even in the highest affluence, can it be otherwise than irksome. The fittest arms, on the whole, for old age, Scipio and Lælius, are the acquirements and the practice of the virtues, which, when cultivated during an entire life-time, yield marvellous fruits; not only because they never fail, not even in the final period of old age (and yet that is an all-important advantage), but also because the consciousness of a well-spent life and the recollection of many virtuous deeds is most delightful.

4. As for myself, when a young man, I loved Q. Maximus, him who recovered Tarentum, though in old age, as warmly as one of my own age. For in that personage there was a dignity refined by courtesy, nor had old age made any change in his deportment; and yet I began to cultivate his intimacy when he was not a very old man, but nevertheless already advanced in life. For he was consul for the first time in the year after I was born; and when a very young man, I marched as a soldier with him, in his fourth consulate, to Capua, and in the fifth year after, as quæstor to Tarentum. Then next I was elected quæstor four years after, which office I filled in the consulship of Tuditanus and Cethegus, at the time indeed when he, a very old man, was promoter of the Cincian law, relative to gifts and largesses; he campaigned, too, with

all the energy of youth, when he was quite old, and by his temper cooled the ardour of Hannibal, wantoning with youthful impetuosity, of whom our friend Ennius finely says:

"One man by delay retrieved our cause,
For he valued not rumour above our safety;
Therefore now brighter and brighter shines the glory of the chief";

and as to Tarentum, with what vigilance, with what skill he recovered it! when indeed, as Salinator, who, after losing the town, had fled into the citadel, was boasting in my hearing, and saying, "It was through my instrumentality you gained Tarentum", he replied to him with a smile, "To be sure it was, for had not you lost it, I should never have regained it". Nor indeed did he excel more in war than in peace, for in his second consulship, while his colleague, Sp. Carvilius, remained passive, he withstood C. Flaminius, tribune of the commons, to the utmost of his power, when he was for dividing the Picenian and Gallic land to individuals, in defiance of the senate; and when he was augur, he had the courage to say, that those measures were taken with the most favourable auspices, which were taken for the safety of the public, and that what was undertaken in contravention of the public interest, was undertaken in opposition to the auspices. Many were the noble characteristics I have observed in that man, but there is nothing more worthy of admiration than the manner in which he bore the death of his son Marcus, a man both famous and of consular rank. The panegyric he pronounced is still in our hands, and when we read it, what philosopher do we not despise! Nor was it only in the light of publicity, and under the eyes of his fellow-citizens, that he was great, but privately, and at home he was still more admirable. What conversation! what maxims! how great a familiarity with ancient history! What a knowledge he had of the law of augury! For a Roman, too, his literary acquirements were extensive. He retained in his memory all, not only domestic but even foreign wars; and I enjoyed his conversation with such avidity, as if I were already divining, what has since happened, that when he was gone, I would have none from whom to learn.

5. For what purpose, then, have I dwelt so long on Maximus? Because you see, I am sure, that it is monstrous to say that an old age like his is miserable. However, all men

cannot be Scipios or Maximi, so as to remember the overturning of cities, engagements by sea and land, the campaigns which they have themselves conducted, the triumphs they have won. For a life also that has been spent in tranquillity, purity, and refinement, there is reserved a gentle and undisturbed old age, such as we have heard that of Plato to have been, who died while composing; such as that of Isocrates, who says that he wrote that book which is entitled the Panethenaican in his ninety-fourth year, and he lived five years after; whose master, Gorgias of Leontium, completed one hundred and seven years, nor did he ever discontinue his peculiar study and occupation; who, when he was asked why he was content to live so long, "I have no charge", said he, "to bring against old age". A splendid reply and worthy of a man of learning! for it is their own vices and their own faults which fools impute to old age. Which that Ennius, of whom I have lately made mention, was not disposed to do:

> "As the gallant courser, who, often at the close of the race, won
> The Olympic prizes, now broken down with old age, takes his rest".

He compares his own old age to that of a spirited and victorious steed; and his old age, indeed, you may remember well, for it was in the nineteenth year after his death these consuls, T. Flaminius and M'. Acilius were elected, and he died in the consulate of Cæpio and Philip, which was the second consulate of the latter, when, as for me indeed, I had advocated the Voconian law, with a strong voice and sound lungs, when sixty-five years old. At the age of seventy (for Ennius attained that age), he sustained two, which are considered the most grievous burdens, with such good humour, that he seemed almost to derive pleasure from them. For when I review it with my mind's eye, I find that there are four causes why old age appears to be miserable: one, that it summons us away from the active world; the second, that it debilitates the frame; the third, that it bereaves us of almost all our enjoyments; the fourth, that by a short interval only it is separated from the grave. Of these causes let us see, if you please, how cogent and reasonable each severally may be.

6. Does old age tear us away from active employments? From what? Is it from those which are performed in the heyday of youth and vigour? Has old age, then, no occupations, which, notwithstanding even the debility of

body, can nevertheless be discharged by the mind? Was then Q. Maximus unoccupied? Was L. Paulus, your father, Scipio, the father-in-law of that worthiest of men, my son, was he unoccupied? Those other old men, Fabricius, Curius, Coruncanii, at the time when they shielded the constitution by their wisdom and character, was their occupation gone? Blindness aggravated the old age of App. Claudius, yet he, when the mind of the senate was disposed to pacification and the conclusion of a treaty with Pyrrhus, did not hesitate to pronounce these words, which Ennius has embodied in verse:

> "Whither have your minds, which ere this used
> To stand unbowed, infatuated, turned themselves?" *

And the remainder with the greatest dignity of expression, for you are familiar with the poem, and yet the speech of Appius is still extant, and this he did seventeen years after his second consulship, after that an interval of ten years between the two consulships had elapsed, and he had filled the office of censor before his first consulship. And from this it is inferred that in the war with Pyrrhus, he was confessedly an old man, and nevertheless so we have heard from our fathers. They advance, therefore, no argument of any weight, who say that old age is not actively employed, and they resemble those who would assert (if there be any such) that the pilot is not employed in navigation, when some are climbing the masts, others running up and down the decks, others pumping out the bilge-water, while the mariner sits at his ease at the stern holding the rudder. He may not be doing what the young men do, but in truth he is much more arduously and much more profitably engaged. It is not by physical strength, or speed, or bodily agility that great actions are performed, but by counsel, by force of character, by judgment, of which faculties old age is wont not only not to sustain a bereavement, but even to receive an increased development. Unless, perhaps, I, who have been engaged in every variety of wars, both as a soldier, as tribune, as lieutenant-general, as consul, seem to you to be now inactive when I am not engaged in wars. And yet it is I who dictate to the senate what wars are to be conducted, and in what manner against Carthage, which has been for a long

* Nobbe properly includes "Viai" in brackets.

time bent on mischief, I am denouncing war, and have been so, long before, of which I shall not cease to have my fears, until I shall have learned that it has been razed to the ground, and would that the immortal gods may be reserving this victory for you, Scipio, to consummate the unfinished exploits of your grandsire, since whose death thirty-three years have elapsed, but all succeeding years shall hail the memory of that warrior. He died the year before my censorship, nine years after my consulship, when in my consulship, he had been created consul a second time. Would he then, had his life been prolonged to the hundredth year, feel dissatisfied with his old age, for he would not have recourse to excursions, nor to wandering, nor would he exercise himself with spears at a distance, or with swords at close quarters, but in counsel, in reflection, and judgment; and were it not that these qualities characterise seniors, our ancestors would never have called their supreme deliberative assembly a senate. Among the Lacedæmonians, indeed, those that fill the highest magistracy are called "elders", as they really are; and if you will feel disposed to read or hear of foreign history, you will find that the greatest republics have been overthrown by young men, and *have been upheld and reëstablished by old men:*

> "Pray how was it that you lost so rapidly your commonwealth,
> So great as it was?"

For in these terms they inquire, as it is in the play of the poet Nævius, and there are other answers, and these especially:

> "Unfledged orators, silly young fellows,
> Put themselves forward".

Precipitation, we may observe, characterises the bloom, discretion the decline of life.

7. But the memory is impaired. I believe it, unless you exercise it, or if you be rather dull by nature. Themistocles had committed to memory the names of all his fellow-citizens: do you think, then, that when he attained an advanced age, he was in the habit of addressing as Lysimachus, him who was Aristides? As for myself, I know not only those who are at present alive, but their fathers also, and their grandfathers; nor have I any fears that in reading the names on tombstones, I may lose my memory, as they say, for by the reading of these very tombstones, I recover my

recollection of the deceased. Nor indeed have I heard of any old man having lost his recollection of the place where he had deposited a treasure: they remember everything about which they care,—the assignation of recognizances, and who are in debt to them, and to what persons they are themselves indebted. What do lawyers—what do pontiffs—what do augurs—what do philosophers, when they grow old? How many things they have retained in their recollection! The faculties of old men remain, provided only there be a continuation of study and application, and that not only in the case of illustrious men, and those who have filled high stations, but also in private and peaceful life. Sophocles continued the composition of tragedies to extreme old age, and for his devotion to this pursuit, when he seemed to neglect the welfare of his family, he was summoned into court by his sons, that as, according to our practice, fathers who mismanage their private affairs, are wont to be interdicted the possession of their goods, so the judges might set him aside from the direction of his family estate, as if a dotard. The old poet is said to have recited to the judges that play, which he was holding in his hands and had just composed, the Œdipus Colonæus, and to have inquired whether that appeared to be the composition of a dotard; and after reciting it he was acquitted by the decision of the judges. Was, then, this man—was Homer—was Simonides—was Hesiod—was Stesichorus—were these men whom I have before mentioned, Isocrates, Gorgias—were those princes of philosophers, Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, Xenocrates, or afterwards, Zeno, Cleanthes, or he whom you have seen even at Rome, Diogenes the stoic—reduced to silence by old age in their respective studies? Was not in all these cases the vigorous prosecution of study commensurate with their life? nay, not to adduce these heavenly pursuits, I can mention the names of Roman peasants of the Sabine district, my own neighbours and intimate acquaintances, in whose absence scarcely ever are any farming operations of more than ordinary importance performed, neither in sowing, nor in reaping, nor in storing up the harvest, and yet this is not so surprising in their case; for there is no person so old, as not to think he can survive a year longer. But they likewise labour assiduously in matters which they are well aware possess no interest at all for them. "He plants trees which another generation may enjoy", as our friend Statius ob-

serves in the "Synephebi". Nor let the husbandman, however old, hesitate to make this reply to the person who inquires "for whom he is sowing": "for the immortal gods, who have ordained not merely that I should inherit these things from my ancestors, but that I should bequeath them likewise to my posterity".

8. Cæcilius makes a wiser observation of an old man speculating on another generation than the following:

"In good truth, old age, if thou bringest in thy train no other fault when thou arrivest, this one is quite sufficient,—that by living long one sees many things which he does not wish to see".

Aye, and perhaps he sees many things which he does wish to see; and even youth frequently meets with circumstances which it does not wish for. But the following observation of the same Cæcilius is still more objectionable:—

"Moreover, indeed, I reckon this the greatest misery of old age,—the consciousness at that time of life of being odious to another".

Nay, it is pleasant, rather than odious; for as sage old men take a delight in young men of good disposition, and the old age of those is alleviated who are courted and beloved by young men, similarly, youths derive pleasure from the maxims of the old, by which they feel themselves attracted to the pursuits of virtue, and I find myself no less agreeable to you than you are to me. Now, you see that old age is not only not languid and inactive, but is ever occupied—ever doing and projecting something—that is, something similar to what has been the pursuit of each in the earlier part of his life. What shall I say of those who gain some accession to their knowledge, as we see Solon boasting in his verse, who says that he becomes an old man* daily while learning something new, as I have done, who became acquainted with Greek literature in my old age, which indeed, I grasped with such avidity, longing to satisfy, as it were, a long protracted thirst, that those very illustrations which you find me now employing, became known to me? And when I heard that Socrates had done this on the lyre, I for my part could wish that I had done that also, for the ancients used to learn the lyre;

* That every day which adds to his age adds to his learning.

however, I have taken pains to acquire their literature at least.

9. Nor even now do I regret the want of the vigour of youth, for that was the second topic on the faults of old age, more than when a young man I regretted the want of the strength of a bull or an elephant. What a man has, that he should use; and whatever you do, you should do it with all your might. For can any expression be more contemptible than that of Milo of Crotona, who, when he was now an old man, and saw the athletes practising themselves in the race-course, is recorded to have glanced at his own arms, and to have said with tears: "But these, indeed, are now dead"? Not, indeed, those arms of yours, you driveller, so much as you yourself, for it was never from yourself your celebrity was derived, but from your chest and arms. No such absurdity did S. Ælius ever utter,—no such absurdity did T. Coruncanius many years before, nor P. Crassus lately, by whom lessons in jurisprudence were given to their countrymen, and whose wisdom was progressive even to their latest breath. As for the orator, I am afraid that his powers may be debilitated by old age, for that is a gift, not only of the mind, but also of lungs and strength. On the whole, that melody of enunciation, I know not how it is, becomes more brilliant even in old age, which I myself have not yet lost, and you see my years; but, however, there is a style of expression which becomes an old man, unimpassioned and subdued, and very often the delicacy and softness which characterises the delivery of an eloquent old man, wins a hearing for itself, and though you be unable to produce this effect yourself, you may be able, nevertheless, to teach it to Scipio and Lælius. For what is there more delightful than an old age which has the studies of youth for its attendants? Shall we not leave to old age even such strength as to teach young men, train them, and fit them for the discharge of every duty? And what occupation can be more delightful than this? To me, indeed, Cn. and Publius Scipio, and your two grandfathers, L. Æmilius and P. Africanus, seemed to be rendered happy by the retinue of their young and noble admirers; nor are any instructors in the liberal arts to be considered otherwise than happy, notwithstanding that their bodily powers may have become old and effete, although that very failure in strength is more frequently entailed by the excesses of youth than of

old age; for a youth spent in lust and intemperance transmits to old age an enervated frame. Cyrus, indeed, in Xenophon, in that discourse which he delivered on his death-bed, when he was a very old man, declares that he never felt his old age to be less vigorous than his youth had been. For my own part, when a boy, I remember L. Metellus (who, though he was appointed pontifex maximus four years after his second consulate, presided over that sacred office twenty-two years) in the enjoyment of such excellent health, that he felt not the want of youth. It is unnecessary for me to say anything of myself, although, indeed, such would be consistent with my old age, and is a privilege conceded to my time of life.

10. Do you observe how, in Homer, Nestor speaks very often of his own virtues, for he was now living in the third generation of men, nor had he any reason to fear that, in telling the truth of himself, he should appear over-weeningly proud or loquacious; for, as Homer says, his speech flowed from his tongue sweeter than honey, and for the exhibition of this sweetness he required no bodily vigour; and yet the famous captain-general of Greece nowhere wishes to have ten men like Ajax, but like Nestor, and with this good fortune he doubts not but that Troy would soon perish. But I revert to my own case. I am in my eighty-fourth year. I could wish, indeed, to have it in my power to make the same boast that Cyrus made, but nevertheless, this I can say, that I am not indeed in the enjoyment of such strength as I enjoyed when I served as a soldier in the Punic war, or as quæstor in the same war, or as consul in Spain, or four years afterwards, when I fought as military tribune at Thermopylæ, M. Atilius Glabrio being consul; but, nevertheless, old age, as you see, has not completely unnerved me or broken me down, the senate finds no diminution of my strength, nor the rostra, nor my friends, nor clients, nor guests, for I have never accorded my assent to that trite and approved proverb, which recommends you to become an old man early, if you wish to be an old man long. For my part, I would rather be an old man for a shorter length of time, than be an old man before my time. Therefore no one, as yet, has wished to have an interview with me to whom I have been passed off as *engaged*. But I have less strength than either of you. Even you do not possess the

powers of T. Pontius, the centurion: is he, therefore, the more honourable man? Only let there be a moderate amount of strength, and let each use his utmost exertions: such a person, indeed, will not be absorbed in any deep regret for the want of strength. Milo is said to have gone over the course of Olympia while he supported a live ox on his shoulders. Would you, then, rather have his strength of body given you, or Pythagoras's powers of mind? In short, avail yourself of that blessingw hile you have it: when you have it not, do not regret its absence, unless, perhaps, young men should regret the loss of boyhood, and, when a little more advanced in life, the loss of youth. There is an accurately defined career of life, and the course of nature is one, and that a simple one, and to each stage of life its peculiar seasonableness has been apportioned; so that both the weakness of boys, and the intrepidity of young men, and the gravity of settled manhood, and the maturity of old age, have some natural quality which ought to be enjoyed in its own appointed season. I suppose, Scipio, that you hear how your grandfather's host, Massinissa, acts at the present day, though ninety years old,—that when he has commenced a journey on foot, he never mounts his horse at all, and when he commences it on horseback, he never dismounts; that he is obliged by no rain, no cold, to go with his head covered; that there is in him the greatest hardiness of constitution; and that, therefore, he discharges all the duties, all the functions of a king. Exercise, therefore, and temperance, are calculated to maintain in old age some remnant of our pristine vigour.

11. Is old age devoid of strength? Strength is not even exacted from old age. Therefore, both by our laws and established customs, our time of life is relieved from those tasks that cannot be undergone without strength. Therefore, not only are we not compelled to do that which we are unable to do, but we are not compelled to do as much as we can. But many old men are so feeble that they are unable to perform any call of duty, or any function of life at all. But that defect does not exclusively belong to old age, but it is in common attributable to ill health. How feeble was the son of P. Africanus' son, he who adopted you! What poor, or rather, no health at all he had! And had not this been so, he would have shone

forth the second luminary of the state; for to the elevation of soul which he had inherited from his father, there had been added a richer store of erudition. What is there, then, to surprise us in the occasional infirmity of old men, when it is a grievance which not even young men can escape? We must make a stand against old age, Lælius and Scipio, and its frailties must be made amends for by our energy. We must take up arms against old age as if against a distemper. We must pay attention to our health; we must avail ourselves of moderate exercise; we must take just so much of meat and drink as to recruit, not to clog, our energies. And not only to the body must we minister, but still more to the mind and heart, for these parts of our nature are extinguished by old age, unless you drop oil upon them as on a lamp; and while our bodies, indeed, become oppressed by fatigue and exercise, our minds are by exercise rendered buoyant, for, as to these whom Cæcilius calls "silly old fellows", by these he means the credulous, the forgetful, the abandoned; which are the faults, not of old age, but of an indolent, slothful, and drowsy old age; as impudence, as lust, characterises young men in a greater degree than old, yet it is a characteristic not of all young men, but of those who are not upright; similarly, that hoary-headed folly (which is generally called dotage) is to be found in frivolous old men, not in all. Appius, although both blind and old, managed four stout sons, five daughters, so large a household, so large a circle of dependants; for he kept his mind at full stretch like a bow, nor did he through languor succumb to the pressure of old age. He retained not merely his influence, but also his command over his family; his slaves regarded him with awe, his children with veneration, all with affection; the manners and discipline of our ancestors operated with full vigour in that family; for under these conditions old age is held in honour, if it be equal to its own defence, if it retain its own peculiar rights, if it be subjected to the thraldom of none, if it assert its empire over those around, even to its latest breath. For, as I am pleased with a young man in whom there is found some characteristic of old age, so am I pleased with an old man in whom there is found some characteristic of a youth; and he who adopts this principle will, possibly, be an old man in body—he will never be an old man in mind. I have in hand the seventh book of

the "Origines". I am compiling all the records of our early history. I am just now giving a finish to my orations in the celebrated causes which I have pleaded. I am treating of the law of augurs, of pontiffs, and the civil law. I am extensively engaged, too, with Greek literature: and after the manner of the Pythagoreans, for the purpose of exercising my memory, I recapitulate in the evening what I have said, heard, or done each day. These are the exercises of the intellect—these the race-courses of the mind. While I am perspiring and toiling over these, I do not much feel the want of bodily vigour. I afford my friends my ready advocacy. I frequently make my appearance in the senate, and I spontaneously lay before the house views which are the result of long and deep reflection, and these I maintain by mental and not bodily vigour. And, if I found myself unequal to the performance of these engagements, yet my couch would afford me amusement in the meditation of these very pursuits, in which I was no longer able to engage; but of my ability to do so, the sort of life I have led is the cause. For, by one who is always engaged in such studies and labours, the precise moment at which old age makes its stealthy approach is not perceived. Thus gradually and imperceptibly our life is merged in old age, and its taper is not suddenly broken,* but by protracted burning dies out.

12. Then follows the third censure upon old age,—that they say it is devoid of pleasure. Oh! what an admirable boon age presents us with, if it divests us of that which is the besetting sin of youth! For attend, my good young friends, to the old speech of Archytas of Tarentum, a man preëminently great and distinguished, which was reported to me when in my young days I was at Tarentum with Q. Maximus. He said that no more deadly pestilence was inflicted by nature on mankind, than the pleasures of the body; for that the craving appetites of this sort of pleasure goaded them on without patience and without restraint to enjoyment; and in this originated the treasons to our country, in this the overthrow of states, in this clandestine correspondence with the enemy,—that, in short, there was no villainy, no deed of guilt, to the undertaking of which the passion of sensuality did not

* Compare Shakspeare: "Out out, brief candle".

impel; but that impurities and adulteries, and all such profligacy, were excited by no other fascinations than those of sensuality. And while there was no attribute which either nature or some divinity had bestowed on man, more excellent than intelligence, that there was nothing which warred so much with this divine boon and emanation as sensuality, for that where appetite domineered, there was no room for self-control, and that in the domain of voluptuousness, virtue could find no abode; and that this might be more fully understood, he bid us imagine to ourselves an individual instigated by the greatest bodily pleasure that could be conceived; he gave it as his opinion, that no one would doubt, that as long as the person continued in such exultation, he would be unable to revolve anything in his mind, or to compass anything by his reason, anything by reflection; that, therefore, there was nothing so detestable, so pestilential, as sensuality, inasmuch as when it increased in extent and duration, it extinguished all the light of the soul. Nearchus of Tarentum, our hope, who had remained faithful to the friendship of the Roman people, said that he had heard from his seniors, that Archytas held this conversation with C. Pontius the Samnite (the father of that Pontius by whom the consuls Sp. Postumius, T. Veturius, were defeated in the battle at Caudium), on which occasion Plato, the Athenian, had been present at the conversation, whom I find to have come to Tarentum in the consulship of L. Camillus and Ap. Claudius. What is the purport of all this? To enable you to understand, that, if we could not derive a contempt for pleasure from reason and wisdom, we should feel deep gratitude to old age for bringing it to pass, that that should not be a pleasure which was not a duty. For pleasure obstructs deliberation, it is a foe to reason, and, so to speak, dazzles the mind's eye—nor has it any intercourse with virtue. I banished from the senate, with reluctance I confess, L. Flaminius, the brother of T. Flaminius, that man of consummate courage, seven years after he had been consul; but I considered that his licentiousness should be branded with infamy. For when he was consul in Gaul, a harlot, in a banquet, prevailed on him to behead one of those who were in custody. Condemned of a capital crime, he slipped through our hands in the censorship of his brother, Titus, who had immediately preceded me: but profligacy so disgraceful and so desperate—

a profligacy that combined a stigma on our empire with personal infamy,—could by no means escape the censure of myself and Flaccus.

13. Often have I heard from my seniors, who said that they again had heard it from old men, that C. Fabricius was in the habit of wondering that when he had been an ambassador with King Pyrrhus, he had heard from Cineas the Thessalian, that there was a certain individual at Athens, who professed to be a philosopher, and that he said that everything we did was to be considered in reference to pleasure, and on hearing him assert this, that M'. Curius and Ti. Coruncanius were in the habit of expressing a wish that such a doctrine were impressed on the Samnites and Pyrrhus himself, that they might be conquered the more easily, when they had surrendered themselves to pleasures. M'. Curius had lived along with P. Decius, who, five years before his consulate, had sacrificed himself in the cause of the republic, in his fourth consulate. Fabricius knew him likewise, Coruncanius knew him, who not only from their own career in life, but also from that of the man whom I mention, P. Decius, inferred that beyond doubt there was something in its own nature fair and glorious, which, for its own sake was to be pursued, and which the best of mankind followed, scorning and despising indulgence. For what purpose have I said so much of pleasure? Not only is it no disparagement, but even the highest merit in old age, that it has not much regret for any pleasures. But it is without banquets, and high tables, and repeated potations. It is for this reason exempt from drunkenness and indigestion and want of sleep. But if some indulgence be extended to pleasure (since it is not easy for us to resist its blandishments, for Plato sublimely calls pleasure the bait of crime, because to be sure men are caught by it as fish with a hook), although old age is excluded from intemperate banquets, it nevertheless can derive pleasure from sober entertainments. In my boyhood I often saw C. Duilius, the son of Marcus, the first who had defeated the Carthaginians in a naval engagement, returning from supper, when an old man, he took a pleasure in a multitude of torches and musicians, privileges which, unauthorized by any precedent, he, though a private individual, had assumed, so much license did glory confer upon him. But why need I mention others? I will now return to myself. In the first

place I have always had club companions. Now clubs were first instituted when I was quæstor on the adoption of the Idæn worship of the Great Mother, so then I used to regale myself with my companions with perfect moderation; however, a certain enthusiasm peculiar to that time of life was felt, but as life advances, every feeling will become daily more subdued, for I did not measure the pleasure I felt in these very entertainments, more by the gratification of sense, than by the company and conversation of my friends, for our ancestors appropriately termed the reclining of friends at entertainments, "convivium", because it formed a bond of life; a better name than that which the Greeks employ, who call this same meeting both a "compotatio" and a "concœnatio", so that they appear to mark with their highest approbation the circumstance which is the least valuable in the class.

14. As for myself, I take delight also in early entertainments, for the amusement of conversation, and not only with those of my own age (very few of whom survive), but also with your age and with you, and I feel deeply indebted to old age for having increased my avidity for conversation, and removed that for eating and drinking. But if even matters of that sort delight any one (that I may not appear to have declared war at all periods against pleasure, to which perhaps we experience some natural* impulse), I am not aware that, even to those very pleasures you mention, old age is devoid of sensibility. As for myself, both the masterships instituted by our ancestors delight me, and that style of conversation which, according to the custom of our ancestors, is kept up over the cups by the person who reclines at the top of the table; and the cups, as in the Symposium of Xenophon, small, and affording small draughts, and the cooling refreshment in the summer time, and in turn, either the sun, or fire in the winter, enjoyments in which I am wont to indulge, even among the Sabines, and I daily fill up a party of my neighbours, which we protract in general conversation till an advanced hour of night, as long as we can. But there is not in old men such a ticklish sensibility as it were to pleasures. I believe not, but no regret even for them is felt, and there is no annoyance in the want of that, the absence of which

* Or reading Modus, "to which there is some natural limit".

you do not regret. Well did Sophocles reply, when a certain person inquired of him, now advanced in life, "whether he enjoyed sexual pleasures", "Heaven send me better luck", says he; "nay, I have cheerfully fled from them, as from a boorish and outrageous tyrant". For to those who are desirous of such delights, it is perhaps hateful and annoying to live without them, but to those who are satisfied and fully gratified, it is pleasanter to want them than to enjoy them, and yet he cannot be said to want them who does not feel their want. I therefore assert, that exemption from desire is pleasanter than enjoyment. But if the vigour of our life enjoys those very pleasures more cheerfully in the first place, it is an enjoyment of petty pleasures, as we have observed, in the next place, it is an enjoyment of those pleasures, of which old age, if it does not possess them abundantly, is not altogether destitute; although the person who sits in the front row of the pit is more delighted with Turpio Ambivius, nevertheless, he too is delighted who sits in the hindmost; thus youth perhaps is more delighted from a near view of pleasure, but old age experiences, from a distant view, as much delight as is sufficient. But of what vast importance are the following circumstances, that the soul, having completed its period of service under the command of lust, ambition, contention, enmities, and all the passions, should retire within its own sphere, and (as we say) should live in solitary independence! But if it is provided with some food, as it were, for study and learning, there is nothing more delightful than an old age of leisure. We saw C. Gallus, the intimate friend of your father, Scipio, almost expire amidst the study of measuring out the divisions of the sky and earth. How often has the dawn surprised him after commencing by night to describe some diagram! how often has the night, when he had begun in the morning! What delight it gave him to predict to us, long before their occurrences, the eclipses of the sun and moon! What shall we say when we consider pursuits less elevated, but nevertheless, requiring acuteness of mind? How transported was Nœvius with his own Punic war; Plautus with his Truculentus, and with his Pseudolus! I saw also Livy, when a dramatic veteran, who, though he had brought out a play six years before I was born, in the consulship of Cento and Tuditanus, advanced in age even up to the period of my

youth. Why should I mention P. Licinius Crassus' study of the pontifical and civil law, or of this P. Scipio who was appointed pontifex maximus within these few days? and yet we have seen all these whom I have mentioned, though of advanced age, enthusiastically pursuing these studies. But as for M. Cethegus, whom Ennius aptly called the "Marrow of Persuasion", with what devotion we saw him engaged in the practice of oratory, even when an old man! What delights, then, either in banquets, or in games, or harlots, are to be compared with these pleasures? And these indeed are the pursuits of learning; which, with the prudent and well-educated, keep pace with the progress of age, so that is a fine observation of Solon, when he declares, in one of his verses,* that he grows old, while daily gaining large accessions to his knowledge, an intellecturl pleasure than which none can be more intense.

15. I come now to agricultural pleasures, and with these I am delighted beyond all belief, and these are neither obstructed by any old age, and appear to me to form the nearest approach to the life of a wise man; for their concern is with the earth, which never refuses her allegiance, and never returns without compensation for its temporary use, what she has received, but sometimes with less, frequently with more liberal interest; and yet to me, not only the fruit of the earth affords pleasure, but even the power and nature of the earth itself, which, when it has received the scattered seed in its softened and well-prepared bosom, first of all confines it, when harrowed over, from which *harrowing* (which has this effect) derives its name, then expands it when warmed with the heat of its own embrace, and draws forth from it the verdant shoot, which, supported by the fibres of the root, gradually springs up, and, raised up by the knotted stalk, is enclosed in a sheaf, as if now advancing to maturity, from which, when it shall have emerged, pours forth the fruit of the ear piled in due order, and by a fence of beards is protected from the beaks of the smaller birds. Why need I mention the planting of the vines, their rising, their increase? that you may know the repose and the delight of my old age, I cannot be satiated with delight. For I say nothing of the nature of all these productions which are raised from the earth,

* Or "that every day which adds to his age adds to his learning".

which generates such trunks and boughs, from so small a grain of the fig, or from the grape-stone, or from the extremely small seeds of other fruit trees and roots, cuttings, grafts, twigs, quicksets, layers,—are not these such as to surprise and delight any one? The vine, indeed, which is by nature prone to fall, and is lowered to the ground, unless it be propped up, likewise to raise itself up, embraces with its tendrils, as it were with hands, whatever it reaches; which, creeping along with a manifold and mazy progress, the skill of the husbandman, lopping with the knife, restrains, to prevent its forming a forest of twigs, and spreading itself too diffusely in every direction. Therefore, in the commencement of spring, on those twigs which are left, there rises up, as it were, at the joint of the twigs, what is called a bud, from which the embryo grape presents itself, which, increasing in size, both from the moisture of the ground and the heat of the sun, at first is very bitter to the taste, then when ripened, it grows sweet, and mantled in leaves, both is not unprovided with moderate warmth, and wards off the excessive heat of the sun; and what can there be in fruit more luxuriant, and in appearance more lovely? and it is not merely its utility, as I before observed, but even its cultivation and very nature delights me,—the rows of supports, the joining of the heads, the binding and propagation of vines, and that pruning of some twigs, and grafting of others, which I have mentioned. Why need I allude to irrigations—why to the digging of the ground—why to trenching operations—by which the earth is rendered much more productive? Why should I speak of the advantage of manuring? I have spoken of it in that treatise which I wrote on country affairs, of which the accomplished Hesiod has not said even a word, when writing on agriculture. But Homer, who lived many generations before him, as I think, represents Laertes alleviating the regret which he felt at his son's absence, by cultivating his land and manuring it. And not merely by reason of corn fields, and meadows, and vineyards, and copses, is rustic life delightful, but also for its gardens and orchards, besides the feeding of cattle, the swarms of bees, and every variety of flowers. And not merely plantings give me pleasure, but even graftings, than which operations agriculture has made no more ingenious discovery.

16. I can enumerate many amusements of country society, but I feel that even these remarks which I have made have been rather long. You will excuse me, however, for I have been carried away by my enthusiasm for rustic pursuits, and old age is naturally rather garrulous, that I may not appear to assert its exemption from all failings. This, then, was the sort of life in which M'. Curius, after triumphing over the Samnites, over the Sabines, and over Pyrrhus, spent the evening of his days, whose villa, indeed, when I survey (for it is not far off from me), I cannot adequately admire either the moderation of the man himself, or the social system of his age. When the Samnites had brought Curius an immense quantity of gold, while he was seated by his fire-side, they were repelled with disdain; for he said, that to him it did not seem so glorious to possess gold, but to rule over those who possessed it. Could so elevated a soul render old age any other than delightful? But I come to farmers, not to digress from myself. Senators, that is, seniors, at that time led a country life, inasmuch as his appointment as dictator was announced to L. Quinctius Cincinnatus while engaged in ploughing, by order of which dictator, C. Servillius Ahala arrested and put to death Sp. Mælius, for aspiring to sovereign power. From their villas, Curius and other old men were summoned to the senate-house, from which circumstance those who summoned them were called "viatores". Was then their old age miserable, who amused themselves with the culture of their farms? In my own opinion, indeed, I know not whether any can be more happy, and not only in the discharge of duty, seeing that farming benefits the whole human race, but also from the gratification which I have mentioned, and the exuberant abundance of everything which is necessary for the sustenance of man, and also the worship of the gods, so that, since some persons do desire these things, we may now become reconciled to pleasure. For the cellar of a worthy and industrious householder is well stored, the oil-casks, the pantry too, and the whole villa is richly supplied, it has plenty of pigs, kids, lambs, hens, milk, cheese, honey; nay, even the farmers themselves call a garden a second desert: besides, the fowling and coursing which fill up their leisure hours, give these viands a greater relish. Why need I speak of the verdure of the meadows,

or the rows of the trees, or the fine display of the vineyards and olive grounds? Let me cut short my panegyric. There can be nothing more exuberant in use, nor more brilliant in display, than a well-cultivated farm, to the enjoyment of which old age not only presents no opposition, but even invites and attracts us. For where can that time of life be more comfortably warmed, either by basking in the sun, or by the fireside, or be more healthfully refreshed by cooling shades and waters? Let them have their arms, their horses, their spears, their play at cudgels, their tennis, their swimming and races; to us old men, let them leave, out of the multitude of amusements, the "tali", and the "tesseræ", whichever they please, since old age can be happy independently of these amusements.

17. The treatises of Xenophon are very useful for many purposes, and read them I pray you, diligently, as you are doing. At what length is agriculture eulogized by him in that book which treats of the management of one's private property, and which is entitled *Œconomicus*. And that you may understand that nothing appears to him so king-like as the pursuit of agriculture, Socrates, in that treatise, converses with Critobulus, *remarking* that Cyrus the younger, king of the Persians, preëminent for his talents and the glory of his empire, when Lysander the Lacedæmonian, a man of consummate valour, had come to him at Sardis, and had brought him presents from the allied powers, both in other respects, was condescending and courteous towards Lysander, and besides, showed him an enclosure, planted with considerable care. And that, when Lysander expressed his admiration both of the tallness of the trees, and the lines arranged in the form of a quincunx, and the ground well cultivated and cleared, and the sweetness of the odours which were exhaled from the flowers, he then observed that he admired not only the diligence, but even the ingenuity of the person by whom these departments had been measured and laid out; and that Cyrus replied to him, "And yet I am the person who measured them all out, mine was the arrangement of the rows, mine the laying out; many also of these trees were measured out by my own hand". That then Lysander, gazing on his purple robe, and the splendour of his person, and his Persian decorations consisting of much gold, and many gems,

said, "Truly, it is with justice, Cyrus, they call you happy, since, in your case, fortune has been combined with merit". This sort of fortune it is in the power of old men to enjoy, and age presents no impediment to our retaining, even to the last stage of old age, our pursuits both of other occupations, and particularly of agriculture. We have heard that M. Valerius Corvus, indeed, lived on to his hundredth year, since his life had been passed amidst the fields which he cultivated, between whose first and sixth consulate there was an interval of forty-six years: so long a space of life as our ancestors appointed to extend to the beginning of old age, so long was his career of honours, and the end of his life was, in this respect, more fortunate than its middle stage, that it was attended with more consideration and less labour. Now, consideration is the crowning distinction of old age. In how large a degree it was possessed by L. Cæcilius Metellus, in how large a degree by Atilius Calatinus, on whom there was that singular inscription, "Very many nations agree that he was the foremost man of his nation". It is a well known epitaph engraved on his tomb. With good reason, then, was he a man of weight, on whose merits universal fame is agreed. How great a man have we seen in P. Crassus, who was lately pontifex maximus! how great a man have we seen afterwards in M. Lepidus, dignified with the same sacred office! What shall I say of Paulus, or Africanus? or, as I have already done, of Maximus? men not only in whose sentence, but even in whose nod, command sat enthroned. Old age especially, if it has been invested with preferment, commands such influence, that it is of more worth than all the pleasures of youth.

18. Now, remember that in my whole address I am praising that old age which has been built on the foundations of youth, and hence that apothegm is inferred which I once pronounced with the marked concurrence of all—that miserable was the old age which had to defend itself by speaking; no gray hairs, no wrinkles, have the power to catch respect all of a sudden, but honourable deportment in the earlier part of life, reaps a harvest of reverence at its close. For these very observances which appear light and common, are marks of respect—to be saluted, to be sought after, to have the way made for one, to have persons rising up to you, to be escorted to and fro, to have your advice asked—matters which, both among u and in

other states, according as the moral basis of each is the soundest, are most scrupulously observed. They say that Lysander the Lacedæmonian, of whom I have just made mention, used to observe, "That old age found in Lacedæmon its most honourable home; for nowhere is so much consideration accorded to years—nowhere is old age more respected". Moreover, it is handed down on record, that when at Athens, during the games, a certain individual, advanced in life, had entered the theatre, in the vast assembly no room was anywhere made for him by his own countrymen, but when he drew near the Lacedæmonians, who had taken their seats in a reserved place, as they were ambassadors, they all rose at once and invited the old man to a seat; and when reiterated plaudits were bestowed on them by the whole assembly, that one of them said: "That the Athenians knew what was right, but were unwilling to do it". There are many admirable usages in our college, but this, particularly, which we are discussing, that according as each is senior, he is entitled to precedence in delivering his opinion; and not only to those who are superiors in preferment, but even to those who are invested with highest power, senior augurs are preferred. What bodily qualifications, then, can be compared with the rewards which influence confers? And those who have made a brilliant use of these seem to me to have consummated the drama of existence, and not like unpractised actors to have broken down in the last act. But old men are morose, and fretful, and irritable, and impracticable, but these are the defects of their moral constitution, and not of old age; and yet that moroseness and those defects, which I have mentioned, are attended with some redeeming features; not, indeed, quite satisfactory, but which may appear deserving to pass uncensured—they imagine that they are despised, looked down on, and made sport of; moreover, when the body is weak, every stroke gives pain; however, all these defects are sweetened both by good manners and good conduct, and this may be learned not only in every-day life, but on the stage, from those brothers which are represented in the play called the Adelphi. What severity of deportment there is in the one—what courtesy in the other! The fact is so, for as all wine does not, so it is not every one's life grows sour from age. I approve of gravity in old age,

but this quality, as every other, within proper limits, asperity in no degree, but as for avarice in an old man, I do not understand it; for can there be anything more absurd, than to seek the larger supply of provisions, the shorter the space of journey there may remain?

19. There remains a fourth reason which seems to fill our lives with the greatest uneasiness and solicitude; that is, the near approach of death, which surely cannot be far off from old age. Oh! what a miserable old man is he, who has not discovered, in so long a life, that death may be defied, which ought either to be regarded with perfect indifference, if it completely annihilates the soul, or ought even to be desired, if it leads forth into some region where it is destined to be immortal! And yet no third possibility can be found, at least. What then have I to fear, if, after death, I am sure to be either not miserable, or to be even happy? And yet, who is such a fool, however young he may be, as to feel assured that he will live to the evening? Nay, even that stage of life is attended with more probabilities of death than our own. Young men more readily fall sick, and their sickness is more severe—their recovery is more painful; and, therefore, few of them attain old age. And were it not for this accident, there would be a greater proportion of goodness and prudence in life. For intelligence, and reflection, and deliberation, are the characteristics of the old, and if there had been no old men, there would not now be any states in existence. But I return to the imminent proximity of death, and is that an imputation on old age, when you see it possessed in common with it, by youth? I have, for my own part, experienced both in the case of my excellent son, and in the case of your brothers, Scipio, men who gave promise of attaining the highest dignity, that death is common to every age. Yet a young man expects to live long, an expectation which an old man cannot likewise entertain. His hope is not a rational one, for what is more foolish than to consider uncertainties, certainties, and delusions, realities? An old man has not even a foundation for hope. Yet he is, in this respect, in a better position than the young man, that he has already attained what the other is only expecting. The one wishes to live long, the other has lived long. And yet, good heaven! what is there of long duration in the life of man? for grant even

the most extended period, let us expect to attain the age of the kings of the Tartessii, for there was (as I find it on record) one Arganthonius, at Gades, who reigned eighty years, and lived a hundred and twenty; but as for me, nothing appears to be of long duration in which there is any extreme limit, for when that comes, then the time which has passed has ebbed away, the sole remnant left is that which you may have won by your own worth and upright conduct; hours indeed vanish, and days, and months, and years, and the past knows no return; nor can a prescience of what follows it be attained. Whatever portion of life is assigned to each, with that ought he to be content. For neither is it the actor's part to perform the entire drama, so as to please the audience, provided he win their approval in whatever act he may appear. Nor need the wise man proceed until he hears the final call for applause. For short as is the span of life, it is long enough for a life of virtue and honour; and if you have proceeded farther on life's journey, you have no reason to regret more than the farmers do, that when the sweetness of spring-tide has passed, the summer and the autumn have arrived, for spring is an emblem of youth, and gives promise of the future fruit: the remaining seasons are adapted to the plucking and gathering in of those fruits. Now, the fruit of old age, as I have repeatedly said, is the memory and profusion of blessings which we have won beforehand. All things, indeed, are to be reckoned blessings, which occur in accordance with nature; and what is there so much in accordance with nature, as for old men to die off? and this, likewise, happens to young men, notwithstanding the opposition and repugnance of nature. Accordingly, young men seem to me to die just as when a powerful fire is extinguished by a large quantity of water; but old men die as it were spontaneously without the application of any force: the exhausted fire dies out, and as fruits are plucked by force from the trees, if they be unripe, but if ripe and mellowed, drop off; thus violence deprives young men of life; maturity, old men, which, indeed, to me is so agreeable, that the nearer I approach death, I seem to gain a glimpse of the shore, and to be, at last, about to sail into harbour after a long voyage.

20. Every stage of life has its definite limit, but there is no precise limit to old age, and your life is properly spent

in it as long as you are able to discharge and maintain the duty of your calling, and yet to regard death with indifference; whence it happens that old age becomes more spirited and resolute than youth. This was the spirit of that answer which was given by Solon to Pisistratus the tyrant, when, inquiring from a reliance on what hope he withstood him with such boldness, he is said to have replied, "On old age". Now the happiest termination of life, is, when with intellect and the other senses unimpaired, the same nature which put together the several parts of the machine, takes her own work to pieces; as the person who has built a ship or a house, likewise takes it down with the greatest ease, so the same nature which glued together the human machine, takes it asunder most skilfully. Moreover, every fastening of glue, when it is fresh, is with difficulty torn asunder, when old, very easily; thus it happens that that brief remnant of existence should neither be passionately desired by old men, or without good reason abandoned; and Pythagoras forbids us to leave our post and station in the battle of life, without orders from our commander, that is, the Deity. There is an observation, indeed, of the philosophic Solon, in which he avows that he does not wish his death to pass without the grief and tears of friends; he wishes, I am sure, that he should be dear to his friends. But I am not sure but that Ennius more wisely says:

> "Let no one honour me with their tears, nor celebrate
> My obsequies with mourning".

It is his opinion, that that death is not to be deplored which an immortality succeeds. Moreover, when a man is expiring, he may have some sense of it, and that for a short time, particularly if he be an old man, but after death, consciousness is a thing to be desired, or has no existence. But this should be a subject of study from our youth, to become indifferent to death; and without this study, no one can have peace of mind, for die we must, beyond all doubt; and it is a matter of uncertainty, whether or not on this very day. How, then, will the man who is every hour fearing the imminent approach of death, be able to be easy in his mind? and on this subject there appears to be no need of a very long disputa-

tion, when I recall to my recollection, not only L. Brutus, who was slain while fighting for the liberation of his country, nor the two Decii, who spurred on their steeds to meet a voluntary death, nor M. Atilius, who set out to submit himself to torture, to preserve the faith he pledged to the enemy, nor the two Scipios, who wished, even with their own corpses, to obstruct the march of the Carthaginians, nor your grandfather, L. Paulus, who, by his death, paid the penalty of his colleague's rashness on the disgraceful field of Cannæ, nor M. Marcellus, whose dead body even the most barbarous enemy did not suffer to remain without funeral honours, but that our legions (as I have recorded in my *Origines)* have often marched with a cheerful and unbending spirit, to a place from which they expected that they would never return. Shall, then, old men, though highly educated, fear an event which young men, and those, indeed, not merely uneducated, but even boors, despise? On the whole (it is my opinion) a satiety of all pursuits superinduces a satiety of life. Boyhood has its specific pursuits: do, then, young men regret their absence? the prime of youth too has its pursuits: does the settled period of life, which is called middle age, seek to recover them? This age, too, has its pursuits; not even are these sought after by old age. Accordingly, as the pursuits of the previous stages of life drop off, so also do those of old age drop off; and, when this happens, satiety of life ripens the hour of death.

21. I confess I see no reason why I should not venture to give you my own sentiments respecting death, because I fancy that I have a clearer perception of it, in proportion to my shorter distance from it. It is my conviction that your fathers, P. Scipio, and you, C. Lælius, men of the highest distinction, and my dearest friends, are still alive, and that theirs is the life which alone deserves the name of life; for whilst we are immured in this prison-house of the body, we are discharging some function and severe task, imposed by destiny, for the heaven-born soul has been lowered down from its sublime tabernacle, and, as it were, buried in the earth, a habitation uncongenial to its divine and imperishable nature. But I am sure that the immortal gods diffused souls in mortal bodies, that creatures might exist who should cultivate the earth, and who, contemplating the order of the heavenly bodies,

should emulate it, in the moderation and regularity of their lives. Nor has reason and discussion alone brought me to this conviction, but also the high reputation and the authority of the greatest philosophers. I used to hear that Pythagoras and his followers, who were almost natives of our country, and who were formerly named the Italian philosophers, never entertained a doubt but that we had souls imbibed from the all-pervading, divine intelligence; besides the arguments for the immortality of the soul, on which Socrates dwelt (Socrates, who was adjudged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of mankind), the last day of his life, were brought home with demonstration to my mind. In short, such is my persuasion, such my sentiments, since the rapidity of our minds is so great, so tenacious their memory of the past, and so prospective their vision of the future, since there are so many arts, so many sciences, so many inventions, that the essence which comprises these powers cannot be perishable; and since the mind is constantly active, and has not the element of motion communicated to it, for it moves spontaneously, that it will never receive any end of motion, because it will never leave itself: and since the nature of the soul is not composite, and has no admixture of any foreign or heterogeneous alloy, that it is not discerptible, and if this be impossible, that its destruction is impossible; and it is a strong proof that men know most things before they have been born, that even when boys, when they are learning difficult arts, they grasp innumerable conceptions with such rapidity that they seem not to be learning them for the first time then, but to be remembering them and calling them to recollection. Such were the arguments of our friend Plato.

22. In Xenophon, moreover, Cyrus the elder thus discourses on his death-bed: "Do not suppose, my dearest sons, that when I shall have left you, I shall exist no where, or lose my being, for not even while I remained with you, did you see my soul, yet you inferred from my own conduct, that it was in the body: be assured, therefore, that its existence is all the same, even although you will continue not to see it. Nor, indeed, would the distinctions of illustrious men survive them, if their own souls exerted no influence in making us retain them longer in our recollection. I can never be convinced that souls, so

long as they remained in mortal bodies, lived, and the moment they left them, perished; nor, indeed, that the soul loses its senses when it has emerged from a senseless body, but that, when purified from every corporeal alloy, it began to assume an unadulterated and genuine form, that then it became sensible. And also, when the constitution of man is taken asunder by death, it is clear whither the other parts severally depart, for they all return to the source from which they sprung; but the soul, alone, is never visible, neither when it remains with us, nor when it leaves us. Nay, more, you see that nothing so much resembles death as sleep, and it is while men sleep, that their souls give the clearest manifestation of their divine origin, for when they are disengaged and free, they have a foresight of much of the future. And from this it is inferred in what condition they will be when they shall have completely emancipated themselves from the thraldom of the body. So then, if this be so, look up to me as to a god; but if the soul is destined to perish with the body, yet in reverence for the gods, who inspect and control this universe of beauty, you will preserve of me an affectionate and sacred memory". These were the dying words of Cyrus.

23. With your pleasure, let us contemplate the examples which our own country presents. No one will ever convince me, Scipio, that either your father, Paulus, or your two grandfathers, Paulus and Africanus, or the father of Africanus, or uncle, or the hosts of eminent men whom it is needless to enumerate, aspired to the achievement of exploits so great as to extend to the recollection of posterity, did they not see, with prophetic eye, that posterity was their inheritance? Do you suppose (to boast of myself to some extent, like all old men), that I should have undertaken such arduous labours by night and day, at home and in war, had I intended to circumscribe my glory within the same precincts as my life? had it not been much happier to spin out a life of leisure and tranquillity, without any toil or struggle; but somehow or other, my soul, elevating its vision, ever looked forward to posterity with such confidence, as if when it had left this world, then, at last, its life would begin; and assuredly, if it were not the case, that souls were immortal, the best spirits of mankind would not struggle to attain a glorious immortality. Why

need I say that the wisest man dies with the greatest, and the most foolish, with the least, resignation? Is it not your opinion that the soul, whose vision is more comprehensive, and extends farther, perceives that it is on its way to a happier state; whereas the body, whose vision is less acute, does not perceive it? for my own part, I am transported with impatience to see your fathers, men whom I respected and loved, and I long to meet, not merely those whom I have personally known, but those also of whom I have heard and read, and have myself written. And indeed, on my way to those, no one assuredly would easily draw me back, or boil me into a second youth as Pelias. But if any god would freely grant me, to become a boy again from this period of my life, and to cry in my cradle, I would decidedly refuse it; nor should I consent, after having run my course, to be called back from the goal to the starting place. For what comfort is there in life? what labour, rather, is there not in it? But admitting that it has, yet it has, at least, either satiety or limitation. For it is not my humour to deplore the loss of life, as many, and those well informed men, have done. Nor do I regret that I have lived, since I have lived in such a way as to believe that I was not born in vain; and I retire from this world as it were from an inn, and not as if from a home, for nature has assigned it to us as an hotel for sojourn, not as a "local habitation". O glorious day! when I shall set out on my journey to that divine conclave and company of spirits, and when to this troubled, this polluted scene I shall bid farewell! For I shall be setting out, not only to meet those men of whom I have before spoken, but also to meet my own Cato, than whom no better man was ever born, or more distinguished for dutiful affection, whose dead body was consumed by me, when it was to be expected that mine should receive that office from him. But his spirit never losing sight of me,* but casting behind a look of longing affection, has no doubt departed into those regions, to which it saw that I myself was destined to come. And I appeared to support my misfortune with no loss of firmness, not that I bore it in indifference, but I consoled myself in my own mind, by the reflection that the absence and separation would not last long. These are

* Compare Gray's Elegy: "Nor cast one longing, lingering look behind".

the circumstances, Scipio (for you said that you and Lælius were often surprised at it), by which my old age is rendered supportable, and not only not irksome, but even delightful. And if I delude myself in the belief that the souls of men are immortal, I am content with my delusion; nor do I wish this delusion, by which I am delighted, to be torn from me while I live; but if I retain no consciousness after death (as some pusillanimous philosophers think), I have no fears that dead philosophers will laugh at my delusion; but if we are not destined to be immortal, it is, nevertheless, desirable for a man to be taken off at the proper time. For nature prescribes a boundary to life, as she does to everything else, and old age is the catastrophe of a life, as of a play, from the fatigue of which we ought to fly, particularly if it be aggravated by satiety. These are the remarks I had to make on old age, and may you live to attain it, that, taught by experience, you may be enabled to appreciate what you have heard from me.

DE AMICITIÂ.

1. Q. Mucius, the augur, used to relate a number of anecdotes concerning his father-in-law, C. Lælius, from memory, and in a pleasant vein, and not to hesitate in giving him the appellation of *wise* throughout his whole discourse. Moreover, I myself had been introduced to Scævola, by my father, in such a way, that as far as I was able and was permitted, I never left the old man's side. Accordingly, I committed to memory many of his sage disquisitions, many, too, of his short and pointed apothegms, and I made it my study to extend my information by this wisdom. And on his death, I betook myself to Scævola, the pontiff, whom, above all others in our state, I venture to pronounce to be the most distinguished, as well by his talents as his justice. But let me speak of this another time: at present I return to the augur. While I remember many of his observations made on several other occasions, I likewise remember this circumstance, that, seated in an arm-chair at home (as his custom was), when both I and a few of his very intimate acquaintances formed the company, he fell into the discussion of a topic which was, at that time, the subject of almost every conversation; for you remember, unquestionably, Atticus, and the more so, because you were very intimate with P. Sulpicius (when he, holding the office of plebeian tribune, became estranged, by a deadly animosity, from Pompey, who was at that time consul, and with whom he had lived on the most cordial and affectionate terms), how great public surprise or regret was expressed. Scævola, therefore, on that occasion, when he had incidentally alluded to that subject, laid before us a discourse of Lælius on Friendship, which had been delivered by the latter, in company with himself and his other son-in-law, C. Fannius, the son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. The views expressed in that disquisition I have committed to

memory, and have laid them before you in my own arbitrary arrangement in this treatise. For I have represented the speakers as if personally engaged in conversation, to prevent the repeated interruption of "say I", and "says he", and that the conversation might appear to be held by persons face to face with each other. For when you frequently pressed me to write some treatise on Friendship, it appeared to me to be a subject worthy of the consideration of all, and of our intimacy. Without reluctance, therefore, have I managed to become, at your request, a public benefactor. But, as in the treatise entitled "Cato Major", on the subject of old age, which was inscribed to you, I introduced Cato, in his old age, discussing the matter, because no character appeared better suited to speak of that period of life than one who had both been an old man for a very long time, and had been even in old age preëminently prosperous; so, since we had learned from our fathers, that a remarkable intimacy had subsisted between C. Lælius and P. Scipio, Lælius appeared to me a suitable character to state these very sentiments on the subject of Friendship, which Scævola remembered to have been discussed by him. Besides, this sort of treatise, based as it is on the sanction of ancient authors, and those of high distinction, appears, I know not how, to possess a greater amount of impressiveness. Therefore it is, that while reading my own composition, I am sometimes disposed to believe that it is Cato who is speaking, and not I myself. But as then, I, an old man, wrote to you, an old man, on the subject of old age, so in this treatise, I, being a most devoted friend, write to a friend on the subject of friendship. It was Cato who spoke on that occasion, than whom there was almost no one older, and no one wiser at that time. On the present occasion Lælius, both a wise man (for such is his character), and one preëminent for the distinguished character of his friendships, speaks on the subject of friendship. I could wish that you would call off your thoughts from me, for a moment, and imagine that it is Lælius himself who is addressing you. C. Fannius and Q. Mucius visit their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. With these the conversation begins. Lælius replies, and the whole of his disquisition relates to friendship, which, as you read, you will find of yourself.

2. These remarks of yours are just, Lælius, and there never was a man more upright, or more glorious, than Africanus. But you are entitled to consider that the eyes of all are now turned on you; you, above all others, they both designate and esteem a wise man. This distinction was lately bestowed on M. Cato; we know that L. Atilius, in the time of our fathers, was called wise, but each of them for a somewhat different reason. Atilius, because he was considered to be profoundly versed in the civil law; Cato, on the ground of his vast experience; many instances are recorded either of his sage foresight, or indefatigable pleading, or pointed replies, both in the senate and the forum. Wherefore, he has already acquired in his old age the surname, as it were, of wise. But they consider you wise in some different way, not only by nature and character, but also from your study and learning, and not as the vulgar, but as the learned designate a wise man, such as there has been now in Greece. For, as regards those who are called the seven wise men, persons who enter into a nice examination of their qualifications, do not consider them to belong to the class of wise men. We have heard that there was one preëminently so at Athens, and that he, indeed, was declared, even by the oracle of Apollo, to be the wisest man. This is the sort of wisdom they consider to be found in you, that you consider your all to be dependent on yourself, and regard the human vicissitudes as secondary to virtue. Therefore they inquire of me (I believe of you, also, Scævola), with what degree of resignation you support the death of Africanus, and the more so, for this reason, because when we had entered the gardens of D. Brutus, the augur, for the purpose of debating, as is our custom, you were not present, although you had been in the habit of observing that day, and that employment of it, with the most careful attention. Scævola.—Several persons do indeed inquire, C. Lælius, as has been stated by Fannius, but I reply by stating what I have observed, that you bear with patience the grief you have sustained at the death of one who was both one of the greatest men, and your dearest friend, and that you could not forbear being deeply moved, and that such indifference was not consistent with your goodness of heart; moreover, as to the fact of your not having been present in our college at the last nones, that the state of your health was the cause

of your absence, and not affliction. LÆLIUS.—You have made a just and true remark, indeed, Scævola, for I ought not to have been withdrawn by any personal annoyance from the fulfilment of that duty which I have always discharged when I was well; nor do I think that an interruption of duty can happen fortuitously to a man who has firmness of character. Moreover, Fannius, in your attributing to me more consideration than I myself either recognize or exact, you act as a friend; but in my opinion, your estimate of Cato is inadequate, for either no one has been a wise man, which I am disposed to believe, or if any one has been so, he was the man. For (not to mention other proofs), with what resignation he supported the death of his son! I remember Paulus, I had seen Gaulus, but their resignation was in the case of boys. Cato's, in the case of a man of mature years and well proved worth. Wherefore, beware of placing even that very man, whom Apollo, as you say, decided to be the wisest, above Cato. For it is the deeds of the latter which are praised, and only the sayings of the former. But of myself (that I may now address you both), form your estimate in this way.

3. Were I to say that I am not affected with regret for the loss of Scipio, I would leave it to philosophers to determine with what degree of propriety I should do so; but unquestionably, I would be guilty of a falsehood. For I am deeply afflicted by the bereavement of such a friend, as no one, in my opinion, shall ever prove to me, and as I can confidently assert, no one certainly has proved; but I am not without a remedy for my sorrow, I am my own comforter, and especially with this consolation, that I am free from that delusion by which most persons are apt to be tormented on the death of their friends, for it is my opinion, that no evil has befallen Scipio; if any misfortune happened, it befell me, and to be grievously distressed at one's own misfortunes, characterises one who loves, not his friend, but himself. In fact, who can deny that his was a glorious end? for unless he felt inclined to aspire after immortality, of which he had not the slightest thought, what did he not obtain which was right for a man to aspire after? A man who, by his inconceivable merit, from his very youth, transcended the most sanguine anticipations of his fellow-citizens, which they had entertained of him when

but a boy, who never canvassed for the consulship, yet was made consul twice, on the first occasion before his time; on the second, in proper time, as it concerned himself, but almost too late for his country, who by the subversion of two cities, the most inveterate enemies of this empire, put an end, not only to the present, but even to future wars. In what terms shall I speak of the exquisite grace of his manners, of his filial affection to his mother, of his liberality to his sisters, of his goodness to his friends, of his justice to all? These are qualities well known to you, and how dear he was to the state, was proved by its grief at his death. Of what advantage, then, to such a man, could the addition of a few years have been? For although old age is not irksome (as I remember Cato asserted in a conversation with myself and Scipio, the year before he died), yet it deprives us of that freshness, which Scipio even yet enjoyed. Wherefore, either in point of fortune or glory, his life was such that nothing could be added to it; moreover, the rapidity of death exempted him from the consciousness of it, and of this kind of death it is difficult to speak, what men suspect, you yourself see. Yet this we may with truth assert, that of the many most illustrious and triumphant days which Scipio saw in the course of his life, that day was the most glorious, when, on the dismissal of the senate, he was escorted home again at evening by the conscript fathers, by the allies of the Roman people, and the Latins, the day before he died; so that from so sublime an elevation of greatness, he appears to have gone rather to the gods above, than to those below. Nor do I concur in the opinion of those who have of late begun to give out this doctrine, that the soul dies simultaneously with the body, and that everything is annihilated by death.

4. The authority of antiquity is of more weight with me, either of our own ancestors, who awarded to the dead such ceremonious rites (and surely they would not have done this, if they thought that those observances did not in any degree affect them), or of those who once lived in this country, and instructed Magna Græcia in their principles and maxims (which at present indeed is destroyed, but was in a flourishing condition then), or of him who was decided by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, who did not, at one time, state one opinion, at another, a different one, but always said the same thing, that the

souls of men are divine, and that when they have departed from the body, a return to heaven is open to them, and the speediest to the most virtuous and most just. And this likewise was the opinion of Scipio, who, indeed, as if he had a presentiment of it a very few days before his death, when both Philus and Manilius were present, and several others, and you also, Scævola, had come with me, descanted for three days on the subject of government, and the end of this disquisition turned almost entirely on the immortality of souls; principles which he said he had learned from Africanus, in a vision during sleep. If this be so, that the spirit of the best in death wings away its flight most easily, as if from the prison-house and chains of the body, whose journey to the gods do we suppose to have been easier than that of Scipio? Wherefore, to mourn over this his sad catastrophe, would, I fear, be the act rather of one who envied him, than of his friend. But if the following principle be more true, that there is one and the self-same end of soul and body, and that no consciousness survives, as there is no benefit in death, so without doubt there is no evil. For when consciousness is lost, it is rendered the same thing as if he had never at all been born; and yet that he was born, both we rejoice, and this state, so long as it exists, will exult. So that (as I above observed) his end was indeed an excellent one; my own fate has been less opportune, for it had been more suitable that, as I came into existence first, so I should depart from it, but, nevertheless, I enjoy the reminiscence of Scipio so fully, that I consider myself to have lived happily, inasmuch as I lived with Scipio, with whom I felt a community of solicitude, both on public and private matters, with whom I had companionship both at home and abroad, and that in which the whole force of friendship is concentrated, a perfect coincidence of inclinations, of pursuits, of sentiments. Accordingly, that reputation for wisdom which Fannius has just mentioned, does not so much gratify me, particularly as it is unmerited, as the hope that the memory of our friendship will last for ever, and this is the more delightful to me, because in all the ages that have elapsed, scarcely three or four pairs of friends are enumerated, and in this class I fancy in myself a hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity. FANNIUS.—That must be so, Lælius, but since

you have made mention of friendship, and as we are disengaged, you will confer on me a very great favour (and I hope on Scipio also), if, as you are in the habit of discussing other matters when questions are asked of you, you would similarly discuss the subject of friendship, *stating* what your sentiments are concerning it, your conception of its nature, and the precepts you would inculcate. SCÆVOLA.—It will be to me highly gratifying, and while I was endeavouring to obtain the same favour from you, Fannius anticipated me, so that you will bestow a very high favour on both of us.

5. I would feel no reluctance indeed, were I assured of my own power, for not only is it a splendid subject, but we, as Fannius said, are disengaged. But who am I, or what ability do I possess? This is a custom of scholars, and besides of Grecian scholars, to have a subject proposed to them on which they are to discourse, however sudden may be the proposal. It is an arduous undertaking, and requires no little practice, wherefore, I give it as my opinion, that you should inquire of those who are in that profession, what topics can be discussed on the subject of friendship; for my own part, I candidly recommend you to value friendship above all earthly objects, for there is nothing so congenial to our nature, so well adapted either to prosperity or adversity. But, in the first place, I am of this opinion, that friendship cannot exist except among the good; this principle I do not push to its extreme, as those do who discuss these matters with over refinement, it may be with truth, but with little adaptation to general utility, for they assert that there is no good man except the wise man—grant this, but they define their wisdom to be such as no mortal has ever compassed; while it is our duty to contemplate those principles which have a real existence in practice and every-day life, and which are not either abstractions or aspirations. I will never say that C. Fabricius, M'. Curius, T. Coruncanius, whom our ancestors considered to be wise, were wise according to the standard of the semoralists; wherefore let them keep for their own use the name of wisdom, both invidious and unintelligible, and let them make this admission, that these were good men. They will not even make this admission, they will say that this title will be conceded to none except to the wise man. Let us, therefore, use our own dull brain, as they say,

They who so comport themselves, so live, that their honour, their integrity, their equity, their liberality, are approved of, and there is not discoverable in them any covetousness, or licentiousness, or boldness, and are characterised by great consistency, as these whom I have mentioned were, let us conclude that those are entitled to the appellation of good, as they are considered; because they follow nature (as far as human beings are able), the best guide of a virtuous life. For I fancy myself to have a clear perception of this, that we have been constituted by nature in such a way that there should be a sort of social communication among all, and the greater according as each approximates most closely to another. Therefore, fellow-citizens are preferable to foreigners, and relatives to strangers, for with those nature has spontaneously produced friendship, but it has not sufficient solidity; for in this respect friendship is superior to relationship, that benevolence can be separated from relationship, but cannot from friendship; for taking away benevolence, the name of friendship is taken away, while that of relationship remains. But the extent of the power of friendship can be most clearly inferred from the fact, that out of the immense aggregation of the human race which nature has spontaneously united, it is a thing so contracted, so narrowed, that the whole sum of affection is confined to two, or a few.

6. Now friendship is nothing else than a perfect concurrence on all subjects, divine and human, accompanied by a feeling of kindness and attachment, and I am not sure that any better boon than this, with the exception of wisdom, could be conferred on man by the immortal gods; some prefer riches to it, some good health, some power, some honours, many prefer even pleasure. This consummation, indeed, is characteristic of brutes, but those former predilections are frail and uncertain, depending not so much on our own deliberation, as on the precipitate levity of fortune. But those who make the supreme good depend on virtue, do so indeed admirably; but this virtue of itself both engenders and maintains friendship, nor without virtue can friendship have any existence at all. Let us now define virtue according to the principle which ordinary life and language would dictate, and let us not mete it out, as some of the learned do, by the pomposity of the terms employed, and let us enumerate among the good, these who

are so considered—the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Phili, life is satisfied with these characters, and let us omit from the list those who are nowhere found to exist. Among such men, then, friendship finds so great facilities as I can scarce describe. In the first place, how can life be worth living for, as Ennius remarks, to one who does not repose on the reciprocated kindness of a friend? what more delightful than to have one to whom you can talk of everything as with yourself? What so great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had not one that would rejoice in it equally with yourself? And as to adversity, it would be difficult to support it without one to support a more grievous portion of it than yourself; in short, other matters, which are objects of pursuit, are severally adapted to particular purposes, riches for you to spend, power that you may be courted, honours that you may be praised, pleasures that you may rejoice, health that you may be exempted from pain, and discharge the functions of the body; friendship comprises the greatest variety of objects, in whatever direction you turn it is at hand, from no position is it excluded, it is never unseasonable, never irksome: therefore we do not use water or fire, as they say, on more occasions than friendship, nor am I now speaking of ordinary or mediocre friendship (and yet even it is both delightful and profitable), but of real and perfect friendship, such as was found in those of whom very few are mentioned, for friendship sheds additional lustre on prosperity, and renders adversity more supportable by dividing and communicating it.

7. And not only does friendship comprise very many and signal advantages, but in this she unquestionably transcends everything, that she reflects the light of a brilliant prospect over the future, and never suffers the spirits to be unnerved or to droop. For he who has a true friend to look to, beholds, as it were, a sort of reflection of himself: wherefore, both when absent they are present, and when in poverty they are rich, and though weak they are in health, and what is still a less intelligible fact, when dead they are alive; to such a degree does the honour, the recollection, the regret, of friends accompany them, and from this consideration the death of one party appears to be a happy one, and the life of the other to be praiseworthy. But if you take away from the nature of things the har-

mony of benevolence, neither a single family or a city would be able to stand, even agriculture would not be maintained; and though it be imperfectly understood how great is the force of friendship and concord, yet it can be estimated from quarrels and dissensions, for what family is there so well established, or what community so firmly based, as that it cannot be utterly subverted by dissensions and discords? and from this an opinion can be formed how much advantage there is in friendship. They record that a certain learned Agrigentine proclaimed in Greek verses this principle,* that whatever cohesions of matter, and whatever motions of bodies, exist in the system of nature, were produced by a principle of friendship or of discord, and this is a principle which all men both understand and illustrate by their conduct. Therefore, if at any time any function of friendship has been exhibited in undergoing or sharing in dangers, who is there who does not extol the act with the highest encomiums? What cheers were raised throughout the entire pit on the exhibition of a new play, by our guest and friend M. Pacuvius, when on the king's expressing his ignorance as to which of them was Orestes, Pylades said, that he was Orestes, that he might undergo execution instead of him; and Orestes maintained, as was the case, tbat he was Orestes? They rose up and applauded in the case of a fiction: what do we suppose they would have done in a real case? Nature easily manifested her own power when men adjudged that to be rightly done in the case of another which they could not do themselves. So far, I fancy, I have been able to lay down my own sentiments on the subject of friendship. If any observations remain to be made, and I am sure there are many, make inquiry of those if you please, who practise such discussions. FANN.—We, however, prefer hearing them from you, although I have often inquired of them and learned their opinions, and not indeed without satisfaction, but the thread of your discourse is somewhat different. SCÆV.—You would say so still more, Fannius, had you been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when the question of government was debated. How able an advocate of justice was he on that occasion against the subtle discourse of Philus! FANN.—It was indeed an easy task for a person of consummate justice to maintain the cause of justice.

* See Baker, who has thus translated the passage.

Scæv.—Why then need I adduce friendship? Would not its advocacy be an easy task to one that has reaped the highest glory for preserving it with perfect fidelity, consistency, and integrity?

8. Læl.—This is indeed to employ force, for what matters it by what kind of appeal you compel me? you compel me beyond all doubt, for to withstand the earnest wishes of one's son-in-law, especially in a good action, is not only difficult, but is not even just. To me, then, repeatedly reflecting on the subject of friendship, this question appeared to be beyond all others entitled to our consideration, whether it is owing to weakness and deficiency that friendship becomes an object of desire, so that while conferring and receiving services, one may obtain from another what he might be unable to acquire of himself, and mutually repay the favour; or whether this may be only an attribute of friendship, and there may be another cause, more remote in its origin, and more beautiful, and more clearly emanating from nature herself? For love (from which friendship has derived its appellation) is in the highest degree adapted to create the harmony of kindliness, for advantages are frequently and often reaped even from those, who, with but the semblance of friendship, meet with deference and respect for a temporary purpose. Now in friendship there is no counterfeit, no affectation, and every feeling that belongs to it is sincere, and flows from the heart. On these grounds, friendship appears to have originated rather in a natural emotion, than a sense of want, and more from an inclination of the soul, accompanied by a certain consciousness of affection, than from a consideration of how much advantage it was likely to entail. And, indeed, its character may be understood even in the case of beasts, for they love their offspring up to a certain time, and are loved by them in such a manner that their emotions are easily perceived. And this fact is still more palpable in the case of man. In the first place, from that fondness which is mutually felt by parents and children, which cannot be severed unless by a revolting wickedness; in the next place, when a similar feeling of affection has existed, if we have found any one of congenial character and disposition, because we imagine that in him we discover, as it were, a sort of halo of integrity and worth. For there is nothing more productive of affection than

virtue, nothing which more strongly attracts us to love, seeing that, because of their worth and integrity, we love, to a certain extent, even those whom we have never seen. Who is there who can mention the name of C. Fabricius and M'. Curius with any other feeling than one of love and affection, though he never saw them? and who is there who does not abhor Tarquinius Superbus, Sp. Cassius, Sp. Mælius? We had a protracted struggle for empire with two generals in Italy, Pyrrhus and Hannibal; for the one, owing to his uprightness, we entertain feelings not excessively estranged; the other, for his barbarity, this state will ever abhor.

9. And if integrity have such efficacy, that we love its manifestation even in those whom we have never seen, or, what is much more, even in an enemy, what wonder if the hearts of men are strongly affected, when they fancy they perceive virtue and goodness in those with whom they can be connected by intercourse; and yet, love is strengthened by the reception of kindness, and by the discovery of an earnest sympathy, and by the closeness of intimacy, and by the application of these aids to that primary emotion of the heart and its affection; there is enkindled an amazing amount of kindliness—and if persons suppose that this originates in a sense of weakness, that a man may have a person through whose instrumentality he may obtain the object of his desire, they leave us, I must confess, an origin of friendship, mean, and by no means generous, so to speak, in maintaining that she is the daughter of want and neediness, and if this were the case, according as each thought himself possessed of the least resources, he would, in the same degree, be best adapted for friendship, which is far from being the case. For just as a person feels the most self-reliance, and is perfectly fortified by worth and wisdom, so as to require no one's aid, and considers that all his interests are dependent on himself, in the same degree he is most preëminent for seeking out and contracting friendship. For what did Africanus want from me? nothing, in truth, and even I did not require aught from him; but I loved him from a certain admiration of his worth; and he, in turn, loved me, perhaps, from some opinion he entertained of my character, and familiarity fostered our affection. But although many signal advantages ensued, yet it was not from an anticipation of

these that the sources of our attachment flowed. For as we are given to kindness and liberality, not to exact a reciprocity of favour (for we are not usurious in our kindness), but are by nature predisposed to liberality, thus as to friendship, not as attracted by the hope of recompense, but because its entire product consists of love, and love alone, do we think it should be pursued. But those who, like beasts, refer everything to sensuality, differ widely in their sentiments from me, and no wonder, for to nothing exalted, to nothing grand, to nothing divine, can they elevate their eyes, who have prostituted all their thoughts on an object so low, so contemptible: wherefore let us exclude such characters from this discourse, and let us be of ourselves persuaded that when the evidence of worth has been established, there is naturally produced a sentiment of love, and an affectionate kindliness, and those who have fondly sought after this integrity, draw nigh and attach themselves to it, that they may enjoy both the intercourse and the character of the men whom they have begun to love, and that they may become equal and commensurate in affection, and more disposed to confer than to demand a return of kindness. And let this honourable emulation between them be maintained, so both the greatest advantages will be derived from friendship, and its origin rather in a natural propension, than in a sense of weakness, will at once have more dignity, for if interest were the cement of friendships, a change in it would disunite them, but it is because nature cannot change, that true friendships are imperishable. You see now, indeed, the origin of friendship, unless, perhaps, you wish to make some reply to these remarks. FANN.—Nay, Lælius, do you go on, for I answer on my own authority for my friend here (who is my junior) SCÆV.—You are quite right, so then let us attend.

10. Attend then, my excellent friends, to these topics, which were frequently discussed between me and Scipio, on the subject of friendship, although he used, indeed, to say that there was nothing more difficult than the continuance of friendship to the very end of life, for that it often happened that the same course was not advantageous to both, or that their political views were different—he remarked, besides, that the characters of men were often changed, in some cases by adversity, in other cases by the increasing pressure of age; and he derived an illustration of these

vicissitudes from the analogy of youth, because the most devoted attachments of boys are often laid aside at one and the same time with the prætexta; and if they should continue to manhood, yet sometimes they are severed by rivalship in the pursuit of matrimony, or some other advantage which both cannot attain. And if men should have had made still further progress in friendship, that yet it is often undermined if they had entered into a competition for preferment—for there is no greater bane to friendship than the desire of money, which is found in the majority of mankind, and in the best a rivalry of honour and glory, owing to which the most virulent animosities have often arisen among the dearest friends. For violent, and generally unreasonable dissensions arise when some request is made of friends, which is not in accordance with rectitude, as, for instance, that they should become panders to their lust, or their supporters in the infliction of wrong—and they who refuse to do so, although they may do so from a sense of honour, yet are accused of abandoning the right which friendship claims, by those to whom they are unwilling to succumb: but they who venture to ask any favour from a friend, by the mere request seem to imply their readiness to do everything for the sake of their friend; by the querulous remonstrances of such person not only are the friendships of the longest standing severed, but even interminable animosities are engendered. These, so many accidents, as if fatalities, menace the continuance of friendships, that, he said, to escape them all seemed to him to be characteristic not only of discretion, but even of good fortune.

11. Therefore let us, in the first place, see, if it be your pleasure, to what extent love ought to proceed in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, was it incumbent on them to join Coriolanus in the invasion of his country? Were their friends bound to second Viscellinus in his ambition for sovereign power, or Sp. Mælius? Nay, in the case of T. Gracchus, when disturbing the public tranquillity, we saw him utterly deserted by Q. Tubero and other friends of the same standing as himself. But C. Blossius, of Cumæ, the friend of our family, Scævola, when he had come to me (for I was assisting the deliberations of the consuls Lænas and Rupilius) to sue for pardon, he adduced this plea, that such was his esteem for Ti. Gracchus, that

he considered it his duty to do whatever he wished. Then, I asked, "even if he wished you to set the Capitol on fire?" "Yes", he replied, "but such a desire he would never have entertained". "But what if he had?" "Then I would have acquiesced". You see the enormity of the expression, and in truth he did so, and even worse than he had said, for he did not follow the rash scheme of T. Gracchus, but headed it, and did not prove himself the attendant of his desperation, but its captain. Therefore, in consequence of their infatuation, being terrified by a fresh prosecution, he fled with precipitate haste into Asia, espoused the cause of the enemy, and satisfied public vengeance by a severe and just retribution. It is, therefore, no palliation of a fault, that you committed it for the sake of a friend, for as the belief of another's worth is the winner of friendship, it is hard for friendship to survive when you have forsaken the path of virtue. Now, if we determine it as an established rule to concede to friends whatever they wish, or to obtain from them whatever we wish, we must have attained perfect wisdom, if such a course entails no vice. But we are speaking now of such friends as are before our eyes, whom we see, or of whom we have heard by report, and with whom every day life is familiar. From this class we must take our instances, and, above all, from those who most closely approximate to wisdom. We find that Papus Æmilius was the intimate friend of C. Luscinus (so we have ascertained from our fathers), that they were twice consuls at the same time, and colleagues in the censorship, and that at the same time M. Curius and T. Coruncanius were on the most intimate terms with them and with each other is handed down on record, and therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of these ever asked of his friend anything that would involve a violation of his honour, of his oath, or the public interest; for what reason is there to make such an observation in the case of such men? I am sure that had any of them urged the request, he would not have obtained it, for they were most conscientious men: besides, it would have been an equal enormity to acquiesce in any such request as to make it. And yet C. Carbo and C. Cato both espoused the cause of T. Gracchus, as did his brother Caius, at that time, indeed, by no means an agitator, but at present one of the most violent.

12. Let this, then, be an established principle in friend-

ship, neither to make requests which are disgraceful, nor to grant them when asked, for it is a scandalous excuse, and not at all an admissible one, both in the case of other offences, and when any one admits that he has acted in opposition to the public interest for the sake of his friend. For we have been stationed at such a post, C. Fannius and Scævola, that it is our duty to descry, in remote prospective, the approaching calamities of our country. For the custom of our ancestors has already deviated considerably from its circuit and career. Tib. Gracchus has attempted to grasp sovereign power, nay, rather, was in possession of it for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen a spectacle like this? Even after his death, his friends and relatives vindicated his cause; and I cannot describe without tears, what they did to P. Scipio, for we withstood Carbo, somehow or other, owing to the recent punishment of T. Gracchus, and as to the tribuneship of C. Gracchus, I have no inclination to augur what I have to anticipate, still the movement is creeping on, and once it has begun, it descends with increasing precipitation to ruin. For already you see, as regards the ballot, what an amount of mischief has been wrought; first by the Gabinian law, and two years after by the Cassian. For already I imagine I can see the people estranged from the senate, and the most momentous measures carried by the caprice of the multitude. For more persons will learn how such measures will be carried than by what means they may be defeated. For what purpose do I say this? Because without partners no one makes any attempt of this kind. Therefore this lesson should be inculcated on all good men, that if through inadvertence they should by any chance have contracted friendship of this description, they are not to suppose themselves so closely bound as not to separate themselves from their friends when they go wrong in some momentous proceeding, at the same time a penalty should be enacted for the unprincipled, and not less severe for those who have followed some one else, than for those who have themselves been the leaders of the heartless treachery. Who in Greece was more famed than Themistocles? who more powerful? and when as general in the Persian war he had emancipated Greece, and losing the public favour, had been driven into exile, he acted the same part as twenty years

before Coriolanus acted among us. These men found no supporter against their country, and therefore each committed suicide. Wherefore, such a combination with unprincipled men must not only find no subterfuge under the excuse of friendship, but should rather be visited with the severest punishments, so that no one may consider himself permitted to follow a friend who is waging war against his country. And, as matters have begun to proceed, I am not sure whether that will not some day be the case. I myself, however, feel no less solicitude as to the position of the republic after my death, than about its condition at the present day.

13. Let this, then, be established as a fundamental law of friendship, to expect from friends only what is honourable, and for our friends' sake do what is honourable, not even to wait until we are asked, to have our zeal ready, our reluctance distant, to delight in giving ingenuous advice, that in our friendship, the influence of our friends, when they offer sound advice, should have the greatest weight, and that this be applied to admonish not only candidly but even sharply, if the case require it, and to act in accordance with it when so applied. For, as to certain individuals who were considered philosophers in Greece, I think they had some curious notions, but there is nothing which they do not follow up with too much refinement; among the rest, that excessive friendships should be avoided, that it may not be necessary for one to feel anxious for many that every one has enough, and more than enough, to regulate his own concerns, that to be needlessly involved in the concerns of others is troublesome, that it was most expedient to keep the reins of friendship loose, so that you might either tighten or relax them at pleasure, for they contend that the essential requisite for a happy life is exemption from care, which the mind cannot enjoy if one man be, as it were, on the rack for others. Moreover, they are said to avow a still more heartless principle (a topic which I have briefly glanced at above) that friendships are to be pursued for the sake of protection and assistance, and not for the sake of kindliness and affection, and therefore the less firmness of character and resources a man possesses, the more earnestly should he seek for friendships; hence it is that women seek the protection of friendship more than men, and the poor more than

the rich, and persons in distress more than those who are considered fortunate in their circumstances. O glorious philosophy! For they seem to take away the sun from the universe, who exclude friendship from life, for we receive no gift from the immortal gods more valuable or gratifying than this, for what is the exemption from care they speak of? Winning, indeed, in exterior, but in many cases deserving in its essential nature to be discarded. Nor is it consistent with reason to refuse to undertake any reputable measure or proceeding, to save yourself from being tormented with anxiety, or to abandon it when undertaken. For if we turn our backs on care, we must turn our backs also on virtue; for it is impossible, without some amount of distress, that she can entertain disdain and abhorrence for the opposite qualities, as kindliness for malice, temperance for licentiousness, and courage for cowardice. Hence it is that you may see that the just are most deeply indignant at unjust actions, the brave with cowards, the virtuous with the abandoned. And therefore this is the essential characteristic of a well-regulated mind, to be delighted with what is good, and to be afflicted by what is contrary. So, then, if disquietude of mind befall a wise man (and unquestionably it does, unless we suppose all human sensibility to be eradicated from his heart), what reason is there why we should banish friendship utterly from life, lest on its account we should expose ourselves to some annoyances? For what difference is there, excluding the emotions of the soul, I do not say between man and a beast, but between a man and rock, or trunk, or anything of that sort? For they are unworthy of our attention who would have virtue callous and made of iron, as it were. For, indeed, not only in other respects, but in friendship also, she is gentle and susceptible, so that the hearts of the virtuous are expanded with joy at the prosperity, and are contracted with sorrow at the adversity of a friend.

14. So, then, the solicitude which must often be entertained for a friend is not so overwhelming as to banish friendship from life, no more than the virtues should be discarded because they bring with them certain cares and troubles. For when it produces friendship (as I observed before), should any indication of virtue shine forth, to which a congenial mind can attach and unite itself, affection

must, of necessity, arise; for what is so absurd as to delight in the hosts of frivolous objects, such as distinctions, glory, magnificent edifices, dress, and the decoration of the exterior, and not take delight in a soul imbued with virtue, in such a soul as can either love, or, so to speak, love in turn, for there is nothing more gratifying than the repayment of kindness and interchange of devoted attentions and good offices. And if we likewise add this observation, which may with propriety be added, that there is nothing which so allures and attracts any object to itself, as congeniality does to friendship, it will assuredly be admitted as a truth, that the good must love the good and attach them to themselves, just as if united by relationship and the ties of nature. Wherefore this, at all events, is manifest, Fannius and Scævola (in my mind), that among the virtuous, kindliness to the good is, as it were, irresistible; and this, indeed, is ordained by nature herself as the very fountain of friendship. But the same kindliness is attached also to the bulk of mankind, for virtue is not unsocial, or heartless, or haughty, since she is accustomed to defend even nations, and to make the wisest provision for their welfare, which, unquestionably, she would not do, if she shrank with abhorrence from all affection for the vulgar. And, for my own part, indeed, those who contract friendships for the sake of interest, seem to me to deprive friendship of its most endearing bond, for it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend, as the love of that friend, which itself affords delight; and the benefit derived from a friend is then, and then alone, delightful, when it is the emanation of zealous affection, and so far is it from being the case, that friendship should be cultivated from a feeling of necessity, that those who, least of all, require the assistance of another, as being possessed of health and means, and especially virtue (on which the surest support is founded), are most liberal and generous. And I am not disposed to think, that it is not even necessary that friends should never have any want, for wherein would our zealous feelings have exhibited their strength, if Scipio had never required my services or advice at home or abroad? Wherefore friendship has not been the effect of interest, but interest of friendship.

15. Those, therefore, who roll in luxury, will not deserve our attention, whenever they discuss the question of friend-

zhip which they have known neither practically nor theoretically. For who is there, I appeal to Heaven! who would consent to roll in opulence, and live surrounded by a superfluity of every luxury, on the condition of his loving none, and himself being loved by none? This is the life of tyrants, in which, and no wonder, no faith, no affection, no unshaken confidence or attachment can exist; all is interminable mistrust and disquietude, for friendship there is no room. For who can love either the man of whom he is afraid, or him by whom he thinks he himself is feared? They receive the hypocrisy of deference merely for a time, but if they happen to fall (as is frequently the case), their poverty of friends is then discovered. And they say that Tarquin expressed this sentiment; on going into exile he discovered what sincere and what faithless friends he had, because at this time he could not recompense either; and yet I am surprised that a man of so arrogant and unaccommodating a temper could find one at all. And as the character of the person whom I have mentioned could not gain true friends, so the opulence of many leading men excludes the possibility of sincere friendship, for not only is fortune herself blind, but she generally renders blind those whom she has embraced. Therefore such persons are almost always hurried away by disdain and insolence, nor can anything be found more insufferable than a fortunate fool. And thus, indeed, one may remark, that those who before were of accommodating manners, are altered by military command, by preferment, by prosperity, and old friendships are despised by them and new friendships cherished. For what can be more foolish than when men are possessed of the greatest influence by their wealth, abilities, and resources, to procure other things which are procured by money—horses, slaves, splendid dress, precious vases—and not to win friends, the best and fairest furniture of life, so to speak? For while they are procuring other valuables, they know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they are toiling. For every one of these things belongs to him who acquires superiority of power, but the possession of friendships is the sure and certain property of each, so that even if these things are preserved which are the mere gifts of fortune, yet a life uncheered or abandoned by friends cannot possibly be happy. But of this enough

16. We are called on, moreover, to lay down what limits there are to friendship, and as it were, what boundaries of love, respecting which I find three opinions offered, none of which I approve of. The first, that we should feel towards our friends as towards ourselves; the second, that our kindliness towards our friends should precisely and equally correspond to their kindness towards us; the third, that whatever estimate a man forms of himself, the same should be formed of him by his friends. To none of those three opinions do I give my implicit assent; nor indeed is the first a reasonable one, that a man should be animated by the same emotions towards his friend as he is towards himself. For how many things which we would never do for ourselves, we do for the sake of our friends! To entreat, to supplicate the unworthy, moreover to inveigh with unusual severity against any one, and to accuse him with unusual vehemence, which in our own cases is not done creditably, but in the case of our friends creditably in the highest degree, and there are many cases in which good men make a large deduction from their own interests, or allow it to be made, that their friends may enjoy them rather than themselves. The second opinion is that which limits friendship to a reciprocity of kind actions and kind wishes; this is indeed to call friendship to account too minutely and penuriously, to see that the balance between the receipts and debts may be even. Real friendship appears to be too rich and too opulent for such a course, and not to watch too narrowly that it may not return more than it has received, nor is there any reason to fear that anything should be lost or fall to the ground, or that more than what is fair should be accumulated on the side of friendship. But the third limitation is the least admissible, that a man should be valued by his friends at whatever estimate he forms of himself; for often, in certain individuals, either their spirit is too humble, or their hope of improving their condition too abject, it does not, therefore, become a friend to treat him as he treats himself, but rather to make every exertion and contrive to cheer the drooping spirits of his friend, and to create in his mind more sanguine hopes and more agreeable reflections. Therefore, I must lay down some other limit of true friendship, as soon as I shall have stated what Scipio was wont especially to censure. He used to say that no sentence could be found more fatal

to friendship than the one enunciated by him who said that a man ought to love as if one day he was determined to hate. Nor indeed could he be brought to believe that this, as was generally thought, was said by Bias, who was considered one of the seven wise men; but that it was the sentiment of some bad or ambitious man, or of one who sought to reduce everything under his own ascendency. For how can any one be a friend to him whose enemy he thinks he possibly may become? Besides it will follow that he desires and wishes that his friend may, as often as possible, go astray, that he may afford him, as it were, so many handles for censure; and again, at the upright conduct and advantages of his friends he must necessarily be tormented, provoked, and filled with envy. This maxim, therefore, to whomsoever it belongs, is powerful only to dissolve friendship. This, rather, should have been the lesson inculcated, that we should exercise such vigilance in the formation of our friendships that we should never begin to love the man whom we could at any time possibly hate. Besides, if we have been less fortunate in our choice, it was Scipio's opinion that it was better to submit to this, than to look forward to a season of animosity.

17. These, then, are the limits which, in my opinion, we should practically adopt, that when the character of friends is faultless, there should be an interchange between them of every concern, of every plan, every inclination, without any exception; so that even if by chance it has happened that the inclinations of our friends, even when unreasonable, require to be supported, if either their life or their reputation is at stake, you may deviate a little from the ordinary line of conduct, provided only that downright infamy be not the consequence; for there is a point to which indulgence may be extended to friendship; nor, indeed, must we be indifferent to reputation, nor ought we disregard the good will of our countrymen, a weapon of no ordinary power in conducting the public administration, although to seek it by obsequiousness and flattery is mean, yet the worth in whose train affection follows is by no means to be disregarded. But frequently (for I revert to Scipio, whose entire discourse was on friendship) he used to regret that in everything else men were comparatively careful, so that every man could tell how many goats or how many sheep he had, yet he could not tell how many

friends he had, and in procuring the former indeed, men exercised consideration, while in the selection of friends they were utterly negligent; nor had they, as it were, any signs or tokens enabling them to discover who were fit for friendship. Those of firm, steady, and consistent character are to be selected, and of this class there is a remarkable scarcity; and, in fact, it is hard for any one to form his judgment without first making the trial. Now actual friendship must supply the test, thus friendship outstrips judgment, and deprives us of the power of making the experiment. It becomes a prudent man, therefore, to repress the impetus of his fondness as he would his chariot, that we may have our friendships, like our horses, fully proved, when the character of our friend has to some extent been tried. Some persons, in the case of a trifling sum of money, clearly exhibit the essential worthlessness of their character. Some, whom a small sum could not affect, are unmasked in the case of a large one. But even if some be found who consider it mean to value money above friendship, where shall we find those who do not prefer dignities, magistracies, military command, posts of authority, influence, to friendship? So that when these considerations are held up on the one side, and the rights of friendship on the other, they would not much prefer the former. For nature is too infirm to regard the possession of power with indifference; and even if they have compassed it by overlooking the claims of friendship, they think that the act will be thrown into the shade, because it was not without powerful reasons that friendship was overlooked. Therefore it is hardest to find sincere friendships among those who are invested with preferment, or engaged in the business of the state; for where will you find the man who would prefer his friend's advancement to his own? What? To omit how irksome, how unsupportable to the majority of mankind appears the participation of misery, and it is not easy to find one who will stoop to share the burden. And yet Ennius properly remarks, "A sure friend is discerned in an unsure cause". Yet these two positions convict most men of worthlessness, and of weakness, either in their prosperity they disdain, or in his misfortunes they abandon their friend.

18. He, therefore, who in both cases shall have proved himself deliberate, consistent, and unalterable in the main-

tenance of friendship, such a person we are bound to look on as one of a class of individuals extremely scarce, nay almost Heavenly. Now, the basis of this steadfastness and consistency which we require in friendship is sincerity. For there is no steadiness where there is insincerity. Moreover, one should be selected who is frank, sociable, and congenial in his sentiments, whose sympathies are stirred by the same circumstances; all which qualities are essential to fidelity, for there can be no faithfulness where there is complexity and crookedness of character; nor, indeed, can the man whose heart is not affected by the same circumstances, and is not congenial in its elements, be either faithful or steady. To those requisites, we must likewise add, that they feel no gratification in bringing forward charges, or believe them when adduced, all which qualities are essential to that steadfastness of which I have been for some time treating. Thus, the observation which I originally made is true, that friendship can only exist among the good, for it becomes a good man (whom we may likewise call a wise man) to observe these two principles in friendship; first, to have no affection or hypocrisy (for to avow one's hatred better becomes the free-born, than to make the brow conceal the heart); in the next place, not only to repudiate the charges which may be brought by another against his friend, but not even to be himself suspicious, always imagining that some offence has been committed by his friend. To this there should be added a certain suavity of conversation and manner, which gives to friendship no ordinary zest. Now, as for gloominess and austerity on every occasion, they carry with them a degree of impressiveness no doubt, but friendship should be less "prisoned and confined", and more attractive and more creative of every kind of courtesy and affability.

19. But in this place there arises a question of some difficulty, whether new friends, worthy of friendship, should even be preferred to old, just as we are in the habit of preferring young colts to old horses? a perplexity unworthy of a man, for of friendship there should be no satiety; as in other things, the oldest things ought to be the sweetest (as those wines which bear old age well), and it is a just remark, "that many bushels of salt must be eaten together"

to complete the duty of friendship. But new ties, if they bring with them a hope that, as in the case of plants which never disappoint, fruit shall one day appear, are not, I must confess, to be discarded. Yet the old connection must be maintained in its own proper rank, for the influence of age and custom is most powerful, moreover in the very case of the horse, which I have just mentioned, if there be no impediment, there is no one who does not more willingly use the one to which he is accustomed, than one unbroken and strange to him, and custom manifests its power not only in the case of an animal, but even in the case of inanimate objects, since we delight in the very scenery of mountain and forest, amidst which we may for any length of time have sojourned. But that which is most essential in friendship is, that superior be on a level with the inferior, for there are instances of preëminence, as was the case with Scipio, one of our own herd, if I may so express myself. He never evinced a preference of himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or other friends of an inferior grade. But his brother, Q. Maximus, a distinguished man, though in no respect his equal, he treated as a superior, merely because he was older; and he wished that all his friends should receive additional dignity through him. And this principle should be carried out and adopted by all, that if persons have acquired any preëminence of worth, genius, or fortune, they should communicate these advantages to their friend, and share them with their nearest connections; that if they be of humble parentage, or if they have kinsmen less powerful than themselves, either in spirit or in fortune, they should increase the consequence of such individuals, and prove to them a source of honour and consideration, as in fables, they who for some time, through ignorance of their origin and of their birth, have been in the position of slaves, when they are discovered, and found to be the sons of either gods or of kings, yet retain their affection towards the shepherds whom, for many years, they considered to be their fathers: and this assuredly is a more imperative duty in the case of real and acknowledged parents, for the harvest of genius and worth, and every excellence, is then most largely gathered, when it is communicated to every one of our connections.

20. Therefore, as those who are superior in the relation of friendship and union, ought to put themselves on a level with their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to regret at being surpassed by their friends, either in genius, or fortune, or consideration; and the most of them are always complaining of something, or even launching forth into reproaches, and the more so if they think they can adduce any service which has been performed from a sense of duty and friendship, and with some labour on their part. To be sure, they are a detestable class of persons who are always upbraiding you with their services, and to remember these is the duty of him on whom they have been conferred, but the person who has conferred them ought never to mention them. Accordingly, as those who are superiors ought to lower their dignity in friendship, so ought they, in a degree, elevate their inferiors; for there are some persons who render their friendships an annoyance, by imagining themselves slighted, which seldom, if ever, happens to any but those who think themselves liable to be slighted, and thus require to be disburdened from this surmise, not only by your profession, but even by your acts. Now, in the first place, it is your duty to bestow only so much advantage on each as you yourself are able to produce; in the next place, as much as the person whom you love and whom you are assisting can support. For how great soever your preëminence might be, you would be unable to advance all your friends to the highest preferments, as Scipio succeeded in procuring the election of P. Rutilus as consul, and failed to do the same for his brother Lucius. Nay, even if you have the influence to procure any honour you please for another, it is nevertheless your duty to consider what he can bear. On the whole, those connections are alone to be considered friendships, when both the minds and the ages of the parties have attained their strength and maturity; nor if many persons in their early days have been devoted to hunting or tennis, are they bound to maintain this intimacy with those whom they loved at that time as being endowed with the same tastes, for on that principle our nurses and pedagogues would claim the largest share of our affection, by right of old acquaintance, who, indeed, should not be forgotten, but receive our respect in some other way; on any other terms, firm friendship cannot be maintained;

for difference of taste ensues, and a dissimilarity in these severs friendship, and for no other reason is it that the good cannot be fond of the unprincipled, nor the unprincipled of the good, unless that there is the greatest possible difference in their characters and tastes; for in friendship this principle may be safely inculcated, not to allow an ill-regulated affection to obstruct the main interests of our friends, which is very often the case. (To appeal to fable.) Could Neoptolemus have taken Troy, if he had been inclined to listen to Lycomedes, at whose court he had been brought up, when with many tears he sought to prevent his journey? And often important occasions arise so that you must bid farewell to your friends, and he who would prevent their occurrence, because he cannot bear the pain of absence, he is both weak and effeminate by nature, and for this very cause unfit to discharge the duties of friendship. And in every case you must consider not only what you would ask of a friend, but what you would allow to be obtained from yourself.

21. There is a species of calamity, as it were, sometimes inevitable in the repudiation of friendship, for our discourse now descends from the intimacies of wise men to common-place friendship. The faults of friends frequently break out, not only on friends themselves, but also on strangers, and the disgrace of such persons must recoil upon their friends. Such friendships therefore should be got rid of by slackening the tie of intercourse; and as I heard Cato remark, they should be ripped rather than rent, unless some utterly unsufferable heartburning should have been kindled, so that it becomes improper, discreditable, and impossible that an estrangement and separation should not at once take place. But if some alteration of character or pursuits should have taken place, as generally happens, or discord in their political conduct have interrupted their union, for I am now speaking, as I a little before observed, of the friendship, not of the wise, but of ordinary characters, it would be necessary for us to take care lest there may be found to be not merely a discontinuance of friendship, but even animosity incurred, for there is nothing more disgraceful than to go to war with one with whom you have lived in terms of intimacy. From his friendship with Q. Pompey, Scipio had, on my account, withdrawn himself, as you know, and moreover he was

estranged from our colleague, Metellus, by the difference of their political views. On both occasions, his comportment was dignified and commanding, and his feelings, though hurt, were not embittered; wherefore, in the first place, pains must be taken to prevent the severance of friends; but if any such accident should happen, that our friendships should seem rather to have burned out than to have been extinguished. We must, indeed, be on our guard, that friendship may not degenerate into bitter enmities, from which altercations, hard words, insults are engendered, and these, notwithstanding, must be borne if they be supportable; and so much consideration should be shown to a friendship of long standing, that the fault should lie with him who inflicts, not with him who sustains the injury. On the whole, there is but one precaution, one safeguard against all such defects and inconveniences, that we should not form precipitate or unworthy attachments. Now, they are fit objects of friendship in which there is found some reason to be loved, a class of persons seldom met with; and indeed all that is excellent is scarce, nor is there a greater difficulty than to find that which is in every respect perfect of its kind. But most persons recognize nothing good in human affairs, unless what is profitable, and in the case of their friends, as with cattle, they love those most dearly from whom they expect that they will receive most profit; and thus they are insensible to the thought, that friendship, being the most beautiful of all objects, and the most adapted to our nature, is intrinsically and for our own sake desirable; nor do they exemplify to themselves the excellence and the power of this quality of friendship; for every one loves himself, not that he may exact from himself some recompense for his affection, but because every one is dear to himself, and unless the same principle be transferred to friendship, no true friend will be ever found, for a friend is, as it were, a second self. And if this is obvious in the case of beasts, birds, fishes, creatures of the field, both tame and wild, that in the first place they love themselves (for this principle came into existence with everything that breathes); in the next place, that they seek and look for some creature of the same kind to which they may unite themselves, and this they do with a longing and a feeling which bears some resemblance to human love; how much more is this the work of nature in man, who both

loves himself, and seeks out another whose soul he may blend so intimately with his own, as to make almost one person out of two.

22. Yet most men preposterously (not to say with effrontery) aspire to have a friend such as they themselves can never be; and expect from their friends allowances which they do not extend to them. Now, if it were fair, first, that a man should first become good himself, and then look out for another like himself. With such characters that solidity of friendship of which we have been for some time treating, can be established, when men are united by kindly feeling; in the first place, they will master those passions of which other men are the slaves, next, they will take delight in equity and justice, and one will undertake anything for the other; nor will the one ever ask of the other anything but what is honourable and right, and they will not merely respect and love each other, but have a feeling of reverence; for he takes from friendship its brightest ornament, who takes from it respect. Accordingly it is a pernicious error in those who think that an unrestricted indulgence of every passion and every vice is extended in friendship. Friendship was given us by nature to be the handmaid of our virtues, not to be the partner of our vices, that, since unassisted virtue could not reach those eminences which are the most exalted, she might do so when allied and associated with a sister power. And if such an alliance between any persons either exists, or has existed, or is likely to exist, their company is to be regarded, in relation to the highest good in this life, the best and happiest. This, I say, is that alliance in which is found everything which man considers desirable—honour, glory, peace, and cheerfulness of heart—so that when those blessings accompany it, life is happy, and without them, cannot be so. And since this is the purest and most exalted of aspirations, if we would realize it, we must devote our energies to virtue, without which we neither gain friendship or anything worthy of pursuit: indeed, where this is overlooked, those who imagine they have friends are at length awakened from their delusion, when some severe disaster compels them to apply the test. Wherefore (for I must repeat it again and again) you should love after you have judged, and not judge after you have loved. But while, in many cases, we suffer for our carelessness, so we

suffer most severely in the choice and cultivation of our friendships; for we adopt a preposterous plan, and set about doing what has been already done, which we are forbidden by the old proverb to do. For being entangled on every side, either in the meshes of daily intercourse or the interchange of kind offices, we all at once, in the middle of our course, snap the tie of friendship, on the occurrence of some misunderstanding.

23. Wherefore, indifference so glaring, in a step of such vast importance, is the more censurable. For friendship is the only point in the affairs of mankind, on the advantages of which every voice is unanimous, although virtue herself is by many persons regarded with contempt, and is said to be a sort of a braggadocio and display. Many persons despise wealth, for as they are content with little, moderate fare and a plain style of living satisfies them. As for preferments, indeed, with the ambition for which some men are set on fire, how many there are who hold them in such contempt, that they think nothing more frivolous or trifling, and likewise as to other things which to some persons seem worthy of admiration, there are very many who think nothing of them; as to friendship, all, to a man, concur in the same sentiment. Both those who have devoted themselves to politics, and those who delight in the acquisition of knowledge and erudition, and those who, in the enjoyment of leisure, confine themselves to their own avocations, and lastly, those who have surrendered themselves entirely to pleasure, feel that without friendship life is nothing, if only they would live in any degree of respectability. For somehow or other friendship coils itself round the life of every man, and does not allow any system of life to be independent of it. Moreover, if there be any of such coarseness and brutality of nature, as to shun and loathe all intercourse with his fellow-man, such as we have heard one Timon to have been at Athens, yet even he cannot refrain from looking out for some one on whom he may disgorge the venom of his misanthropy. And the best criterion of this would be formed if something of this kind could occur, that some divinity should remove us from this crowded concourse of men, and place us anywhere in solitude, and there supplying us with an abundance and profusion of everything which nature requires, yet should take from us altogether the power of seeing any human being, who would be so callous as to be

able to endure such a life, and whom solitude would not deprive of the enjoyment of every pleasure? There is, therefore, truth in the expression which I have heard an old man state to have been commonly used by Archytas of Tarentum, as I conceive, and heard from others, their seniors, that if any one could have ascended to the sky, and surveyed the universe of nature, and the beauty of the stars, that such admiration would be insipid to him, and yet would be most delightful if he had found some one to whom he might describe it. Thus nature loves nothing solitary, and always stretches out to something as to a prop, and this, too, is the sweetest charm of the fondest friendships.

24. But while nature speaks aloud in so many symbols, as to her inclinations, her pursuits, and her longings, yet, somehow or other we grow deaf to her voice, and hearken not to her admonitions, for the intercourse of friendship is varied and complicated, and many occasions are presented for suspicion and offence, which it becomes a discreet friend sometimes to avoid, sometimes to make light of, sometimes to endure.* One capital source of offence must be diminished, so as to maintain in friendship its truth and sincerity; for friends frequently require to be admonished and reproved, and these admonitions are to be taken in good part when they are kindly given. But, somehow or other, what my intimate friend says in the Andrian is true—"Complaisance begets friends, truth ill-will". Truth is painful if ill-will is engendered by it, which is the bane of friendship. But complaisance is still more painful in its results, because by indulging his faults it allows a friend to run headlong to destruction; but the greatest of all faults is his, who both despises the truth, and is driven by his complaisance into dishonesty. In this step, therefore, all your consideration and carefulness must be exerted—first, that your advice be free from bitterness; in the next place, that your rebuke be without insult. In our complaisance, moreover (for I willingly adopt Terence's expression), let there be an affability, let servility of opinion, the pander of the vices, be far removed, which is not only not worthy of a friend, but not even of a freeman, for you live on different terms with a tyrant and with a friend. Now, his salvation is past hope whose ears are

* See Riddle.

sealed against the truth, so that he is unable to hear the truth from a friend; for it is a shrewd remark of Cato, like many others of his, "that bitter enemies deserve better at the hands of some, than those friends who have the appearance of being agreeable; that the former often speak the truth, the latter never". And it is absurd that those who are advised, are not susceptible of the annoyance which they ought to feel, but feel that from which they ought to be free; for they are not provoked at having gone astray, but are offended at being rebuked; whereas, on the contrary, they ought to regard their misconduct, and be glad at its correction.

25. As, therefore, both to give and receive advice is the essential characteristic of true friendship, and that the one should act with freedom, not with severity, and the other receive his friend's advice with patience, not with repugnance; so we must think that to friendships there is no greater bane than adulation, fawning, and servility of opinion; for this vice should be branded with as many names as possible, as being the characteristic of worthless and designing men, who say everything to please and nothing from a regard to truth. Now, while affectation is in any thing to be found fault with (for it banishes all examination of truth, and adulterates it), so is it especially repugnant to friendship; for it destroys veracity, without which, the name of friendship has no meaning. For, since the strength of friendship consists in this, that one soul is as it were made out of many, how could that be effected, if not even in one individual there could be found a soul which always maintained its unity and identity, but was characterised by fickleness, mobility, and complexity? For what can be so pliable, so wavering, as the soul of that man who changes himself, not only to suit the feelings and wishes, but even the look and nod of another? "Does any one say 'no'? I say no; does any body say 'yes'? I say 'yes'! in short, I have made it an imperative rule to assent to everything", as Terence likewise says, but he speaks in the character of Gnatho, and to employ a friend of this sort is an act of downright folly. Now, there are many like Gnatho, though superior to him in rank, fortune, and character, and the flattery of those persons is offensive, since respectability is associated with insincerity. Moreover, a fawning friend may be distinguished from a true one, and

the difference be recognized by the exertion of vigilance, just as everything which is dyed and counterfeit, from what is unadulterated and genuine. The assembly of the people, which is composed of the least informed persons, yet can determine the difference between the hunter after popularity, that is, the flatterer, and the worthless citizen, and between the consistent, the dignified, and commanding. By what flatteries did C. Papirius lately insinuate himself into the ears of the assembly, when he was recommending a law for the election of Tribunes of the commons! We spoke against the measure, but I say nothing of myself. I will speak with more satisfaction of Scipio; ye immortal gods! what an impressiveness—what a majesty there was in his speech! so that you might easily pronounce him to be the leader and not the follower of the Roman people. But you were present, and the speech is still extant, and accordingly this law, devised as it was to gratify the people, was rejected by the votes of the people. And (to return to myself) you remember in the consulate of Q. Maximus, the brother of Scipio, and L. Mancinus, how popular the act relative to the priesthood of C. Licinius Crassus seemed to be? for the election of the colleges was transferred by it to the presentation of the people. And he first commenced the practice of addressing the people with his face turned to the forum, and yet reverence for the immortal gods, with our advocacy, achieved an easy triumph over that specious harangue; and this occurred in my prætorship, five years before I was appointed consul; accordingly, that cause was supported rather by its intrinsic strength than by the influence of its advocate.

26. Now, if upon the stage of public life, that is, before the assembly, where there is ample room for counterfeits and imperfect imitations, truth, nevertheless, asserts its ascendency (if only it be developed and elucidated), what ought to be the case in friendship, which is entirely measured by truth, in which (as the saying is), unless you see an open heart, and show your own also, you can have no confidence, no certainty; you cannot even love and be loved, since you are not aware how far it may be sincerely done. And that deference of opinion, however ruinous it be, can injure no one but the man who receives it and is pleased with it. Thus it happens that he opens his ears most widely to flatterers who is himself a flatterer, and takes the

greatest delight in himself. Virtue, we must certainly admit, does love herself, for she knows herself best, and understands how amiable she is; but I am not now speaking of virtue, but of a conceit of virtue, for not so many aspire to be endowed with virtue itself as to seem to be so. Flattery delights such men; to such men, when language, fabricated to suit their inclinations, is addressed, they consider those hollow expressions to be the testimony of their own merits. This, therefore, is no friendship, when one does not wish to hear the truth, and the other is prompt to tell lies. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies appear witty, unless there were swaggering soldiers. "Does, then, Thais return me many thanks?" it was sufficient to reply "many", she says "infinite". The flatterer invariably exaggerates that which he, for whose gratification it is spoken, wishes to be great; wherefore, although that flattering falsehood may have weight with those who attract and invite it, nevertheless, even men of stronger and firmer characters are to be warned to take care lest they be ensnared by such cunning flattery, for every one observes an open flatterer unless one who is exceedingly stupid. But you must studiously guard against the insinuations of the ingenious and disguised flatterer, inasmuch as he often conveys his flattery even through the medium of opposition, and with an affectation of discussion fawns on you, and eventually surrenders, and allows himself to be defeated, so that the victim of the mockery may wear the appearance of a more comprehensive vision. Now, what is more shameful than to be made a fool of? And to prevent this happening, we exercise more caution, as in Epiclerus, "To-day, above all the old fellows of the comedy, you will have turned me about and dressed me most richly, for this is the silliest character in the play, that of an unthinking, credulous old fellow". But, unaccountably, my remarks have deviated from the friendships of the perfect, that is, of wise men (for I speak of such wisdom which appears to come within the reach of men), into frivolous friendships. Wherefore let me return to my original topics, and bring them at last to some conclusion.

27. It is virtue, it is virtue, I repeat, C. Fannius and you Q. Mucius, which both wins and preserves friendship; for in her is found adaptation of all circumstances, in her steadfastness, in her consistency: for when she hath

exalted herself and exhibited her own effulgence, and hath observed and recognized the same in another, she draws near it, and in her turn receives what is in the other, and from this is kindled an emotion of love, a friendship; for both derive their name from loving. Now, loving is nothing else than to feel attached to the person whom you love, from no sense of necessity, for the attachment of no advantage. And yet this spontaneously springs up from friendship, even though you may not have pursued it. That was the affection with which I loved in my youth those remarkable old men, L. Paulus, M. Cato, C. Gallus, P. Nasica, and T. Gracchus, the father-in-law of our friend Scipio; this, too, is more clearly perceptible between persons of the same years, as between me and Scipio, L. Furius, P. Rupilius, Sp. Mummius; and now, in turn, in my old days, I repose on the affection of the young, as on yours, as on that of Q. Tubero, and indeed I take great pleasure in the intimacy even of the very youthful, of P. Rutilius and A. Virginius. And since the constitution of our life and nature is so regulated that age succeeds age, it is, indeed, above all things to be desired, that you may be enabled to reach the goal, as they say, with those companions with whom you have been started, as it were, from the barrier. But seeing that the affairs of man are frail and perishable, some persons must ever be sought for whom we may love, and by whom we may be loved, for without affection and kindliness all pleasantness is banished from existence. To me indeed, though he was suddenly hurried away, Scipio still lives, and will for ever live, for it was the worth of that celebrated man I loved, and that worth is not yet extinct, and not only is it ever present before my eyes alone, who had it ever before me, but even among posterity it will be famous and renowned: no one will ever undertake in imagination or in hope, achievements of extraordinary magnitude, who will not consider that he should propose for his own emulation that great man's memory and example. For my own part I confess that of all the benefits which either nature or fortune has conferred upon me, I have none which I can compare to the friendship of Scipio. In it I found identity of political principles, in it I found advice in my private concerns, in it, too, I found a repose replete with pleasure; never even in the most trifling particular did I offend him, as far at least as I observed; never did I hear anything

from him which I regretted to have heard. We had one dwelling between us, the same food, and that partaken of in each other's company; and not only military service, but even our excursions and visits to the country, were enjoyed in each other's society. For what shall I say of our pursuits in the uninterrupted pursuit of knowledge, in which we spent all our leisure in seclusion from the eyes of the world? And if the recollection and memory of these enjoyments had died along with him, I could by no means support the loss of my most devoted and affectionate friend; but these joys have not perished, nay, they are rather fostered and increased by reflection and memory, and even if I were altogether bereaved of them, yet age itself would bring me great consolation; for, at my time of life, I cannot have long to remain afflicted at his loss. Now, every distress, how great soever it be, should be supportable, if it be transitory. These are the observations I had to make on friendship. But, as for you, I advise you to lay the foundation of a virtuous life, without which friendship cannot exist, in such a way as to feel that there is nothing which surpasses friendship.

THE END.

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